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Persecution for reasons of religion is one of the five grounds enumerated in the 1951 Con-
vention relating to the Status of Refugees. The travauxpriparatoires do not include any discus-
sion of religion as a Convention ground for protection. The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria
for Determining Refugee Status contains three paragraphs (71-73) addressing religious persecu-
tion, which demonstrate the intent that the Convention ground be interpreted by reference to
international norms on freedom of thought, conscience and religion. To date there has
been very little interpretive guidance on religion-based claims. The approach to determining
the key elements in a refugee adjudication- what is a religion, what constitutes persecution in
the context of religious practice, when is the persecution 'for reasons of' the individual's
religious beliefs- are less clear today than they were when the 1951 Refugee Convention was
drafted. This article surveys thejurisprudence of religion-based claims of four State parties to
the Convention (the United States, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom),
identifies relevant issues and trends, and proposes an analytical framework for religion-
based claims which is derived from international norms of protection for religion and belief.
1. Introduction
The recognition of freedom of religion or belief as a fundamental
human right is well-established in numerous international' and regional
* An earlier version of this article was commissioned by the Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees for the Roundtable on Religion-Based Refugee Claims, 30-31 October 2002,
Baltimore, Maryland, sponsored by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and Church World Service. The earlier version was prepared in conjunction withJeremy T. Gunn, The
Comptexity of Religious Persecution (2002), which has been published asJeremy T. Gunn, 'The Complexity
of Religion and The Definition of "Religion" in International Law', 16 Har. Hum. Rts. 7. 189 (2003).
I would like to acknowledge the helpful insights and comments of Larry Katzman, Larry Bottinick,
Alice Edwards, Eleanor Acer, Dot Ivey, Jeremy Gunn, Elisabeth Wood, Richard Boswell and David
Matas. I am especially grateful to my research assistant, Tala Hartsough, whose excellent work and
meticulous attention to details over the entire course of this project was invaluable. I also thank
Luciana Svidler and Marcelle Rice for their research assistance at the final stages of the paper. Finally,
many people helped me track down difficult to find resources, and otherwise responded to my requests
for information; included among them arc Jackie Peirce, Hugh Southey, Mark Symes, and the
excellent librarians at the University of California, Hastings, Vincent Moyer andJulie Horst.
I See, for example, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UNGA res. 217A(III), 10 Dec. 1948,
Art. 18 [hereinafter 'Universal Declaration' or 'UDHR'I; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, UNGA res. 2200A(XXI), 23 Mar. 1976, Art. 18 [hereinafter 'ICCPR' or 'CCPR'];
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, UNGA res. 36/55, 25 Nov. 1981, Art. I [hereinafter 'Declaration'].
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instruments. 2 Religion or belief has also 'long been the basis upon which
governments and peoples have singled others out for persecution'. 3 The
twentieth century bore witness to the Nazi genocide againstJews, in which
millions perished and those seeking protection were often turned back.4 It
was this great tragedy, and the failure of the international community to
protect World War II refugees that gave rise to the contemporary refugee
protection regime. The Jewish victims of the Holocaust were clearly
contemplated by the drafters of the Refugee Convention when they
included religion as one of the five grounds for protection in the Conven-
tion. Religious persecution, and the importance of protection from it, has
not become an anachronism in the half-century following World War II.
To the contrary, although the contours and context of religious persecu-
tion have changed since World War II, its persistence as a contemporary
reality has not.
Following the Holocaust, and under the rule of the former Soviet Union
and Eastern bloc countries, religious persecution often took the form of
'[s] tate policies against religion and policies designed to control religious
2 See, for example, Art. 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force 3 Sept. 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]; Art.
12 of the American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
(entered into force 18 July 1978); Art. 8 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
adopted 27June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force
21 Oct. 1986); Principle VII of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(Helsinki Accords) (adopted 1 Aug. 1975); Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986-89,
Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Principle 16.
3 In 1986, Elizabeth Odio Benito, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, observed that religious
persecution has been with humankind for many years, and continues to the present:
History is full of stories resulting at least partly from religious intolerance between nations: the
Crusades (againstJews, Orthodox Christians and Muslims) from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries;
the sixteenth century wars of religion, the Thirty Years War, in the seventeenth century, the wars
between Islam and Christendom from the eighth to the nineteenth centuries, etc. Unfortunately, we
are not yet free from such international human destruction resulting from religious intolerance.
Elizabeth Odio Benito, 'Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on
Religion or Belief, Study of the current dimensions of the problems of intolerance and of discrimina-
tion on grounds of religion or belief: UN doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26, 31 Aug. 1986, para. 157.
The refugee scholar Guy S. Goodwin-Gill has made a similar observation regarding the prevalence of
religious persecution through the ages; referring to the massacre and oppression of the Huguenots in
the seventeenth century following revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the pogroms ofJews in Russia and
Armenian Christians in Ottoman Turkey in the nineteenth century, and the genocide against Jews
under the Nazi and Axis powers in the twentieth century. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in
International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2d edn., 1996), 44.
4 One of the best known incidents of the United States' refusal of protection was the turning
back of the vessel St. Louis. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, Harold Hongju Koh has referred to the 'ill fated voyage of the St. Louis in 1939' as the
'Voyage of the Damned ... when the United States rebuffed fleeing Jewish refugees who had
arrived in New York and Miami harbors, forcing many back to die in Nazi gas chambers'.
Harold Hongju Koh, 'Reflections on Refoulement', 35 Hare. Int'l Law J. 1 (1994), 7, citing
Gordon Thomas & M. Morgan Witts, Voyage of the Damned (1974).
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matters in the name of a political ideology . ... 5 With the dissolution of
the Soviet Union, the existence of totalitarian anti-religious States has
dramatically declined,6 and religious persecution is now more likely to
be associated with the rise of nationalism and religious fundamentalism.
Successive U.N. reports have detailed how these trends have resulted in an
upsurge of violations against minorities as well as women, 7 in a complex
socio-political context where 'it is no easy task to make a clear distinction
between religious conflicts and those of other kinds, particularly political
and ethnic'.
8
The persistence of religious persecution into the twenty-first century
assures that it will continue to be a Convention ground upon which claims
for protection are based. Some scholars have observed that religion will
not only continue to be a significant ground, but that it is likely to gain
increasing prominence as a ground of protection 9 because of the
resurgence in fundamentalism and nationalism, 10 the relationship bet-
ween religion or belief and the rights of women, and the sustained
concern with religious freedom or belief at the international 12 as well as
State level. 13
5 'Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination based on Religion or Belief': UN Doc. A/53/279, 24 Aug. 1998, para. 85(a)(transmits
interim report prepared by Special Rapporteur).
6 'Elimination of all forms of Religious Intolerance': UN doc. A/54/386, 23 Sept. 1999, para.
132(a) (note by the Secretary General transmitting interim report by the Special Rapporteur, identify-
ing China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Viet Nam as countries where state policies
against religion persist).
7 See, for example, A/53/279, n. 5 above, para. 85(b) and (d); A/54/386, n. 6 above, para. 132(3),
133 139; 'Civil and Political Rights, including Religious Intolerance: Report submitted by Abdelfattah
Amor, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1999/39':
UN doc. E/CN.4/2000/65, 15 Feb. 2000, para. 173-175; 'Civil and Political Rights, including
Religious Intolerance: Report submitted by Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur, in accordance
with Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/33': UN doc. E/CN.4/2001/63, 13 Feb. 2001,
paras. 181-188.
8 'Civil and Political Rights, including Religious Intolerance: Report submitted by Abdelfattah
Amor, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1998/18':
UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/58, II Jan. 1999, para. 115(e).
9 James C. Hathaway, The Law ofRefugee Status (Toronto: Butterworths 1991), 145, n. 72; Deborah
E. Anker, Law of Asylum in the United States (Boston: Refugee Law Center, 3d edn., 1999), 398-99.
10 See Hathaway, n. 9 above, 145, n. 72; Anker, n. 9 above, 399.
11 See Anker, n. 9 above, 399.
12 Since 1987 the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights has examined State
compliance with the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimina-
tion based on Religion or Belief, and has submitted annual reports to the Commission. Beginning in
1994, the Special Rapporteur's reports have also been submitted to the General Assembly. E/CN.4/
2001/63, n. 7 above, para. 1.
13 In the United States concern regarding freedom of religion and belief is demonstrated by
enactment of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6401 and following.
The Act requires, inter alia, the preparation and submission of annual reports to Congress on interna-
tional religious freedom, 22 U.S.C.A. § 6412(b), and includes within its mandate issues related to the
protection of individuals fleeing religious persecution, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6471-4.
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At the same time as there is recognition of the growing importance of
religion-based claims, there is also recognition of the analytical complexity
posed by these claims. The clear-cut, familiar model of a totalitarian State
forbidding all religious practice has all but given way to a myriad of situa-
tions involving States that do not prohibit practice, but may instead have an
official religion, or simply favor one religion over another and discriminate
against those who are not adherents of the favored religion. Non-state, as
well as State, actors may commit acts of persecution. The persecution may
be inter-religious (directed against religious adherents or communities of
different faiths or no faith at all), intra-religious (within the same religion,
but between different sects) or both inter-religious and intra-religious. 14
Not only are the contexts in which persecution takes place more varied
than under the 'classic' anti-religion totalitarian model, but the nature of
religious belief or practice raises new questions. Christianity, Islam,
Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism are all clearly recognized as religions;
they are referred to as the 'major religions' of the world. 15 However,
depending on who is doing the categorizing, other communities of belief
may not readily be recognized as religions or beliefs coming within the
parameters of the international norm of protection. 16 The ongoing
controversy over Scientology is illustrative of the range of perspectives
on classifying a belief community as a religion or not.
In addition, it has become increasingly clear that the motivations for
'religious persecution' are more complicated than might initially appear.
Factors related to religion are often inextricably intertwined with 'non-
religion' factors. As the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance
observed in his 13 April 2000 report, 'deviation in creed alone does not
14 See, for example, A/54/386, n. 7 above, para. 129.15 'Elimination of all forms of Religious Intolerance: note by the Secretary-General': UN doc. A/
56/253, 31 Jul. 2001, para. 100 (transmitting interim report of Special Rapporteur on Religious
Intolerance).16 In a recent report, the Special Rapporteur highlighted the controversies that can exist over the
definition of various communities of belief:
[S]ome communities can be classified, depending on who is doing the classifying ... as either a variant
of a major religion or as a separate religion, or even as a belief or organization with goals unrelated to
any religion or belief. For instance, the Ahmadi claim to be Muslims and are recognized as such in
some countries, including Bangladesh, but are denied such recognition in Pakistan. Similarly, the
Jehovah's Witnesses claim to be part of the Christian community and are recognized as being part of it
in several States but are termed a sect by other States. Scientology is the most polemical example
insofar as it calls itself a religion, is viewed as such for tax purposes in the United States, but is called a
sect or even a criminal organization in certain other States, especially in Europe.
Ibid., para. 102
In another report, the U.N. Special Rapporteur has pointed out that religious minorities are often
referred to pejoratively as 'sects' in order to avoid calling them 'religions'. 'Elimination of all forms of
Religious Intolerance: note by the Secretary-General': UN doc. A/55/280, 8 Sept. 2000, para. 92
(transmitting interim report of special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance).
17 See Arthur Helton & Jochen Munker, 'Religion and Persecution: Should the United States
Provide Refuge to German Scientologists?', II JRL 310 (1999).
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account for [religious] persecution'. 18 Religious discrimination and perse-
cution arise from a complex set of factors having to do with 'questions of
politics and power, relations between States, social and cultural factors,
economics and even ancient history'. 19 These observations draw on, and
echo, an earlier U.N. report by Special Rapporteur Elizabeth Odio
Benito:
A final point that should be borne in mind when seeking out the causes of
intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief is that these causes are
often interrelated. The underlying causes of any form of discrimination are com-
plex, multifaceted and intertwined. Gordon Allport, the late, leading social psy-
chologist, offers several general reasons for religious discrimination in his book on
the nature of prejudice. One cause suggests that piety is a 'mask' for prejudices
which intrinsically have nothing to do with religion. Instead it is historical, socio-
cultural or physical factors that have provoked the dislike and hostility. Hence
religion is not the cornerstone of the discrimination. Rather, the conceptions of the
teachings of a religion have been twisted and construed to condone the prejudice. 20
It is in the context of the growing importance of religion-based claims, and
with the recognition of the complicated historical and socio-political fac-
tors within which the claims arise that this paper is undertaken. The right
to freedom of religion or belief, and the value placed upon protecting
individuals from religious persecution is beyond cavil. But the analytical
framework necessary to respond to the claims raised in the twenty-first
century is less clear. To date, there has been very little interpretive
guidance on religion-based claims. The approach to determining the key
elements in a refugee adjudication - what is a religion, what constitutes
persecution in the context of religious practice, when is the persecution 'for
reasons of' the individual's religious beliefs - are less clear today than they
were when the 1951 Refugee Convention was drafted. This paper is
intended to address the need for a contemporary review of religion-
based claims, and the concomitant need for the development of a frame-
work for refugee adjudicators.
This paper begins with a discussion of the religion-based persecution
ground in the 1951 Refugee Convention (Part 2.1) and freedom of religion
or belief in international law (Part 2.2). The core of the paper is Part 3,
which provides a survey and analysis of State jurisprudence (of the com-
mon law countries of the United States, Canada, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom) on elements of the refugee definition relevant to reli-
gion-based claims. Each section concludes with recommendations for an
18 'Racial Discrimination and Religious Discrimination: Identification and Measures', UN doc. A/
CONF. 189/PC. 1/7, 13 Apr. 2000, para. 123 (transmitted by Secretary-General).
19 Ibid.
20 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26, n. 3 above, para. 163.
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analytical approach which is derived from and consistent with relevant
international norms.
2. International standards
2.1 The Convention, the Travaux Preparatoires, and the
UNHCR Handbook
Persecution for reasons of religion is one of the five grounds enumerated in
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. The travaux
priparatoires do not include any discussion of religion as a Convention
ground for protection. 2' The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determin-
ing Refugee Status2 2 contains three paragraphs addressing religious persecu-
tion, which demonstrate the intent that the Convention ground
be interpreted by reference to international norms on freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. The relevant Handbook paragraphs are 71-73:
71. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Human Rights Cove-
nant proclaim the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, which
right includes the freedom of a person to change his religion and his freedom to
manifest it in public or private, in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
72. Persecution for 'reasons of religion' may assume various forms, e.g. prohibition
of membership of a religious community, of worship in private or in public, of
religious instruction, or serious measures of discrimination imposed on persons
because they practise their religion or belong to a particular religious community.
73. Mere membership of a particular religious community will normally not be
enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status. There may, however, be special
circumstances where mere membership can be a sufficient ground.23
Beyond the Handbook, there are no further explications of this ground in
the form of Executive Committee Conclusions or Guidelines. On several
occasions, the UNHCR has expressed its position in the form of briefs of
amicus curaie, specifically on the issue of conscientious objection as a basis
for asylum (discussed in Part 3.4.3.1) 24 . Given the dearth of authority
21 The only discussion of religion appears to be related to the inclusion of Art. 4 of the Convention
regarding the guarantee of freedom of religion to refugees in Contracting States. Nehemiah Robinson,
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees - Its History, Contents and Interpretation: A Commentary (New York:
Institute ofJewish Affairs, 1953), 65.
22 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteriafor Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees: UN doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV. I, Reedited, Geneva,
Jan. 1992 (1979) [hereinafter 'Handbook or 'UNHCR Handbook].
24 Ibid., para. 71-73.
24 The briefs referred to are the amicus curiae brief submitted by UNHCR to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Canas-Segovia v. LN.S., 902 F.2d 717 (9' Cir. 1990), authored by Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill, Susan Timberlake and Ralph Steinhardt (reproduced in full in 2 JRL 390 (1990); and
the amicus curaie brief submitted by UNHCR to U.K. Court of Appeal in Sepet and Bulbul v. Secretary of
State for Home Department (UNHCR Intervening) [2001] EWCA Civ 681 (reproduced in part in Karen
Musalo, Jennifer Moore & Richard A. Boswell, Refugee Law and Policy: A Comparative and International
Approach (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2d edn., 2001) 313.
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directly generated by UNHCR, and the obvious intent to interpret the
Convention ground of religion in a manner consistent with international
norms, an important source of guidance is that provided by the various
treaties, declarations and other relevant interpretive guidance (such as
General Comments of the U.N. Human Rights Committee) on freedom
of religion or belief. It is to these sources of authority that the following
section addresses itself.
2.2 The International Norm on Freedom of Religion or Belief
2.2.1 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and other Relevant International Guidance
Although the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion had
limited recognition in international law as early as the sixteenth century,
25
it was with the establishment of the United Nations that the right has its
origins as an international norm. Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) specifically 26 addresses the right as follows:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.
The principles articulated in the UDHR were incorporated into Article 18
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice,
and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and
teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
25 Arcot Krishnaswami, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, 'Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and
Practices': UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev. 1 (1960), see generally introduction [hereinafter
'Krishnaswami Report']. See also Karen Musalo, 'Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee
Protections from Human Rights Norms' (1994) 15 Mich. J. Int'l Law 1179 (detailing existence of
unilateral and multilateral treaties for the limited protection of the rights of religious minorities).
26 Both the Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, and the UDHR Art. 2 contain more
general provisions regarding religion. Art. I of the U.N. Charter affirms that a fundamental purpose of
the United Nations is 'promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion', while Art. 2 of the UDHR
provides that: 'Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status'.
27 UDHR, n. 1 above, Art. 18.
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4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect
for the liberty ofparents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious
.. . .. .. . 28
and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.
In 1981 the U.N. General Assembly adopted by unanimous vote the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dis-
crimination Based on Religion or Belief.2 9 Although it is not binding, the
Declaration is considered to constitute an important elaboration on the
right to freedom of religion or belief.
30
2.2.2 The Scope of the Rght to Freedom of Religion or Belief
Although the ICCPR itself does not define 'religion or belief there is
extensive guidance in the travaux, as well as from the bodies3 1 relevant
to the ICCPR's implementation. This discussion draws from these
sources.
Article 18 of the ICCPR protects both religious and non-religious forms
of belief.32 Thus it protects the right to hold a belief as well as the 'right33
not to profess any religion or belief. Comprehended within this freedom
is the right to choose, change or retain the religion or belief of one's
choice. This right to freedom of belief is absolute, and not subject to
28 ICCPR, n. I above, Art. 18.
29 Declaration, n. I above, item 75.
30 Article I of the Declaration provides:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall
include freedom to have a religion or whatever belief of his choice and freedom, either individually
or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have a religion or belief
of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are
prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
The Declaration also addresses the right of individuals to be free from discrimination on the grounds
of religion or belief(Art. 2), and the concomitant responsibility of States to take measures to prevent
such discrimination (Art. 4). Ibid., Art. 1-2,4.
31 The two main entities referred to within this section are the U.N. Human Rights Committee,
created by Art. 28 of the ICCPR, which issues General Comments interpreting protected rights under
the Covenant, and the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance.
32 Manfred Nowak, U.. Covenant on Civil and Political Rihts: CCPR Commentay (Kehl: N.P. Engel,
1993), 316. The subject of whether the term 'belief' also protects non-religious convictions 'was the
subject of extensive discussion' during the drafting of Art. 18, and it is clear from the travauxpriparatoires
that the term 'belief' was to cover non-religious beliefs such as 'agnosticism, free thought, atheism and
rationalism'. Ibid.
33 'General Comment adopted by the Human Rights Committee under Article 40, para-
graph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights': UN doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.4, 27 Sept. 1993, para. 2 (adopted 20 July 1993) [hereinafter General Comment
No. 22].
34 Ibid., para. 5.
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any limitations whatsoever. 35 States are to refrain from 'coercion' or any
other measures which might 'impair' this unconditional freedom.
36
Article 18 also protects the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief in
public. The freedom to manifest religion or belief 'encompasses a broad
range of acts'.
3 7
The concept of worship extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct
expression to belief, as well as various practices integral to such acts, including
the building of places of worship, the use of ritual formulae and objects, the
display of symbols, and the observance of holidays and days of rest. The obser-
vance and practice of religion or belief may include not only ceremonial acts but
also such customs as the observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of
distinctive clothing or head coverings, participation in rituals associated with
certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language customarily spoken by
a group. In addition, the practice and teaching of religion or belief includes acts
integral to the conduct by religious groups of their basic affairs, such as the
freedom to choose their religious leaders, priests and teachers, the freedom to
establish seminaries or religious schools and the freedom to prepare and distribute
religious texts or publications.
38
Article 18 distinguishes between inner freedom of belief, and outer or
public freedom to manifest one's beliefs. Whereas the former is absolute,
the latter is subject to limitations specified in Article 18.3. Pursuant to
Article 18.3, any limitation on the manifestation of religion or belief must
be (1) prescribed by law, (2) serve one of listed purposes (public safety,
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others)
and (3) be necessary for attaining the purpose asserted.
The requirement that the limitation be prescribed by law means that it
must be 'set down in a ... parliamentary act in the formal sense or an
equivalent unwritten norm of common law in a manner adequately
specified for the enforcement organs'. 39 The listed purposes are exhaustive
rather than illustrative; limitations for any other reason are not per-
mitted.40 The requirement that the limitation be 'necessary' towards
35 Ibid.
36 The [U.N. Human Rights] Committee observes that the freedom to 'have or adopt' a religion or
belief necessarily entails freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one's
current religion. Art. 18.2 bars coercion that would impair the right to have or adopt a religion or
belief, including the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-
believers to adhere to their religious beliefs and congregations, to recant their religion or belief or to
convert. Policies or practices having the same intention or effect, such as, for example, those restricting
access to education, medical care, employment or the rights guaranteed by article 25 and other
provisions ofthe Covenant, are similarly inconsistent with article 18.2. The same protection is enjoyed
by holders of all beliefs of a non-religious nature'. Ibid.37 Ibid., para. 4.
38 Ibid.
39 Nowak, n. 32 above, 325.
40 '[P] aragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are not allowed on grounds
not specified there, even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the
Covenant, such as national security'. General Comment No. 22, n. 33 above, at para. 8.
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these purposes 'implies that the restriction must be proportional in severity
and intensity to the purpose being sought ... ,.41 The importance attached
to the right to freedom of religion or belief is underscored by the fact that it
is non-derogable, even in times of public emergency.
4 2
3. Interpretive Issues Related to Religion-based Claims
under the Refugee Convention and State Jurisprudence
Overview
This paper is based upon the premise that the drafters of the Refugee
Convention intended international norms relating to freedom of religion
or belief to inform the determination of claims based on religion. It is
therefore assumed, for the purposes of the analysis herein, that the defini-
tion of persecution should be interpreted with sensitivity to the parameters
of the protected right, and that the other elements of the refugee definition
(well-foundedness and nexus) should take into consideration the overarch-
ing objective of protection for this fundamental right. In addition, it is
assumed that evidentiary standards, such as the criteria to be applied to
credibility determinations, should not be applied in a manner which
unfairly disadvantages claims based on religion.
In this context, the survey of State jurisprudence was undertaken for
the purpose of identifying interpretive issues and trends which demon-
strate sensitivity to and consistency with the international norm, as well as
those which do not. The identification and evaluation of the various
interpretive trends provides the underpinnings for the formulation of the
paper's recommendations. The recommendations are proposed to address
interpretive trends which undermine protection and appear inconsistent
with international norms. Wherever possible, the recommendations adopt
the approach of those State tribunals which are well-reasoned and demon-
strate the highest level of consistency with the international norm of
protection for religion or belief.
The cases which are discussed herein are not intended to represent an
exhaustive compilation of the decisional law of each of the four States.
Rather they are intended to be representative of the approach to a
particular issue in that State; furthermore, they were selected to provide
the best example of that issue. Not every jurisdiction had published
decisions relevant to the issues considered in this paper. Therefore,
there are some substantive areas which only discuss the caselaw of three
41 Nowak, n. 32 above, 325.
42 ICCPR Art. 4.2 lists Art. 18 as one ofthe seven articles from which no derogation may be made.
ICCPR, n. 1 above, Art. 4.2.
43 As noted above, the discussion of State jurisprudence in this paper is limited to the United States,
Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
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of the four States, or two of the four States. Finally, the amount of details
reported for any given case varies. For the discussion of certain substan-
tive areas the facts of the cases are significant in order to discuss the
decision;44 in other situations, this is not the case. Thus, it should be clear
that the more extensive discussion of facts in some areas, and not in
others, was intentional.
3.1 Persecution
3.1.1 The Definition of Persecution in Refugee Jurisprudence
As the UNHCR Handbook 51 observes, '[t] here is no universally accepted
definition of "persecution" ... '. The Handbook goes on to state that a
'threat to life or freedom on account of [the Convention reasons] is always
persecution' as are 'serious violations of human rights'.4 5 However, the
type of possible harms that may befall an individual are manifold and
varied, and tribunals continue to struggle to reach a consistent interpreta-
tion of the term persecution.
There is consensus in refugee jurisprudence for the principle that
persecution requires that the feared harm be of a serious or grave nature.
However, beyond that point there is far less agreement. For example, there
is ongoing controversy as to whether a harm inflicted on a single occasion
can constitute persecution, or whether the term implies repetitive or
ongoing harm. Goodwin-Gil14 6 is a proponent of the former approach,
while Hathaway47 of the latter.
There has also been a divergence in the jurisprudence regarding perse-
cution by non-state agents. Pursuant to the 'accountability or complicity'
view, refugee protection is only appropriately extended in cases involving
non-state agents where the asylum seeker's State encourages persecution,
or is unwilling to offer protection (in other words is 'complicit' with the
persecution).48 In contrast, under the protection view, refugee status may
44 In order to fully appreciate a decision regarding whether cumulative acts of harm rise to the level
of persecution, it is necessary to consider what the cumulative acts were. Therefore, a review of the
facts are important. In other cases, the focus might be more on issues of law (i.e., the applicable rule to
establish causation) and in such cases the discussion of facts may not need to be so extensive.
45 UNHCR, Handbook, n. 22 above, para. 51.
46 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill has written: 'There being no limits to the perverse side of human
imagination, little purpose is served by attempting to list all known measures of persecution. Assess-
ments must be made from case to case by taking account, on the one hand, of the notion of individual
integrity and human dignity and, on the other hand, of the manner and degree to which they stand to
be ijured'. Goodwin-Gill, n. 3 above, 69.
47 James C. Hathaway has conceptualized persecution as 'the sustained or systemic failure of state
protection in relation to one of the core entitlements which has been recognized by the international
community'. Hathaway, n. 9 above, 112.
48 In the year 2000, it was reported that within the European Union, courts in France, Germany and
Spain generally followed the accountability view. See Andrea Subhan, ed., 'Asylum in the EU Member
States': Directorate General for Research Working Paper No. LIBE 108 EN (Brussels: European
Parliament, 2000), 11-12, available at (http://www.europarl.eu.int/workingpapers/libe/pdf/l08_en.pdf).
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be accorded in situations where the State is not complicit, but is simply
unable or ineffective in providing protection from non-state agents, as well
as in situations where there is no State or effective central government.
49
UNHCR recommends the protection view, which is now becoming the
clear majority position. 5
0
3.1.2 State Jurisprudence Regarding Persecution
There are two broad issues of significance regarding persecution which
arise in religion-based claims. The first has to do with the nature and
gravity of the harm required to constitute persecution. Religion-based
claims often involve discrimination against members of disfavored reli-
gious communities, limitations or restrictions on religious practice, or
forced compliance with a particular religious practice. An important
inquiry is when these harms rise to the level of persecution. A second
important issue is the role of the State in cases involving non-state agents of
persecution. The four States looked at for the purposes of this paper all
accept the protection view, that is, that Convention protection may be
extended to the victims of non-state agents when the State is either unable
or ineffective in providing protection. However, a frequently occurring
issue relates to the proper criteria for evaluating whether there has been a
failure of State protection. These two sets of issues are the focus of the
discussion in this section.
3.1.2.1 The Nature and Gravio of the Harm Required to Constitute Persecution
Discrimination Imposed because of Religion; When does Discrimination Rise
to the Level of Persecution?
In many countries, the members of a disfavored religious group are subject
to discriminatory measures. These measures may be accompanied by
physical harms and other threats to their physical integrity. This section
examines cases where physical harm was not the central aspect of the
claim, and the adjudicator was called upon to determine whether other
49 For an extended discussion ofthe accountability and protection approaches, seeJennifer Moore,
'Whither the Accountability Theory: Second Class Status for Third-Party Refugees as a Threat to
International Refugee Protection', 13 JRL 32 (2001).
50 In the context of evolving harmonization, the European Union recently issued a proposed
Council Directive which states that the 'practice of the vast majority of Member States and other
global actors' affirms that a fear may be well-founded where it 'emanates not only from the State but
also from parties or organisations controlling the State or from non-state actors where the State is unable
or unwilling to provide effective protection' [emphasis added]. Commission of the European Communities,
'Proposal for a Council Directive laying down minimum standards for the qualification and status of
third country nationals and stateless persons as refugees, in accordance with the 1951 Convention
relating to the status of refugees and the 1967 protocol, or as persons who otherwise need international
protection' (2001/0207), at Art. 9, available at (http://www.statewatch.org/news/2OOl/sep/
REFDIR.DOC).
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prejudicial measures - considered singularly or cumulatively - rise to
the level of persecution.
An analysis of discrimination in religion-based claims should have as its
point of departure the principle that pursuant to international norms any
form of discrimination on the basis of religion is impermissible. CCPR
General Comment No. 2251 addresses this point, providing in relevant
part that:
The fact that a religion is recognized as a state religion or that it is established as
official or traditional or that its followers comprise the majority of the population,
shall not result in any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the
Covenant ... nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or
non-believers. In particular, certain measures discriminating against the latter,
such as measures restricting eligibility for government service to members of the
predominant religion or giving economic privileges to them or imposing special
restrictions on the practice of other faiths, are not in accordance with the
prohibition of discrimination based on religion or belief and the guarantee of
equal protection under article 26.52
Even though discrimination for reasons of religion is prohibited, not all
discrimination constitutes the basis for a claim to refugee protection. It is
only when the discrimination is of a grave enough nature to rise to the level
of persecution. Guidance on this issue is provided by the UNHCR Hand-
book in the following paragraphs:
54. Differences in the treatment of various groups do indeed exist to a greater or
lesser extent in many societies. Persons who receive less favourable treatment as a
result of such differences are not necessarily victims of persecution. It is only in
certain circumstances that discrimination will amount to persecution. This would
be so if measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially pre-
judicial nature for the person concerned, e.g., serious restrictions on his right to
earn his livelihood, his right to practise his religion, or his access to normally
available educational facilities.
55. Where measures of discrimination are, in themselves, not of a serious
character, they may nevertheless give rise to a reasonable fear of persecution if
they produce, in the mind of the person concerned, a feeling of apprehension and
insecurity as regards his future existence. Whether or not such measures
of discrimination in themselves amount to persecution must be determined in
the light of all the circumstances. A claim to fear of persecution will of course
be stronger where a person has been the victim of a number of discriminatory
measures of this type and where there is thus a cumulative element involved.
53
51 General Comment No. 22, n. 33 above, para. 9.
52 Art. 26 of the ICCPR provides that:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection
of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. ICCPR, n. I
above, Art. 26.
53 UNHCR, Handbook, n. 22 above.
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Thus, in order to constitute persecution, the discrimination must 'lead to
consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature' or 'give rise to a reason-
able fear of persecution' and must be considered in 'light of all the
circumstances'. The cumulative nature of the discriminatory actions are
to be taken into consideration in making this determination.
As discussed below, a survey of the caselaw shows an uneven application
of this principle, and the all too frequent reluctance to categorize pervasive
and serious forms of discrimination as persecution.
United States
There are very few U.S. cases which provide a clear presentation5 4 of a
claim based on discrimination on account of religion. 5 Notwithstanding
that fact, there are numerous cases which include language addressing the
distinction between persecution and 'mere' discrimination or harassment.
U.S. courts have stated that persecution 'is an extreme concept, which
ordinarily does not include discrimination on the basis of race or religion,
as morally reprehensible as it may be', 56 and that it does not 'include every
kind of treatment our society regards as offensive'. 57 The only published
decision which directly and explicitly addresses the issue of religious dis-
crimination is Matter of Salama,5 8 which dates from 1966 and involved an
Egyptian Jew seeking protection at a time when the 'government cam-
paign of discrimination was responsible for the departure of some 37 000
Jews from Egypt', 59 for the boycott of Jewish doctors, and for the
expulsion of Jewish professionals from professional societies. 60 Under
54 In a number of cases the details of the alleged discrimination were not clearly developed in the
record. See, e.g., Ghaly v. IjNS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1428 (9h Cir. 1995) (where there is reference to 'prejudice
and occasional acts of individual discrimination from Egypt's Islamic maority' but no discussion as to
what form the discrimination took); Elnager v. INS, 930 F.2d 784, 788 (9t Cir. 1990) (where the court
stated that the testimony of the Egyptian convert to Christianity 'displays little more than the
fact that religious converts in Egypt may have a "hard time"' and no other details appeared to be
provided).
In other cases there were allegations of discrimination, but non-discrimination factors appeared
dispositive of the court's decision. See, for example, Ambati v. INS, 233 F.3d 1054, 1057-60 (7 th Cir.
2000) (applicant from India alleged discrimination with resulting economic and physical hardships by
Hindus against his father and brothers because of their Christian faith, but he did not recount
discriminatory measures against himself, his wife or his children); Yousifv. IS, 794 F.2d 236, 243
(6'h Cir. 1986) (the court upheld the BIA's denial to reopen case of Iraqi Christian who alleged
discrimination/persecution where there were inconsistencies between the facts he asserted and those
contained in his sister's affidavit submitted on his behalf).
55 Cases involving gender discrimination may be analyzed as religious persecution claims. Gender
claims - as well as the issue of discrimination/persecution will be addressed in Part 3.4.3.3.
56 Gonzalez v. INS, 82 F.2d 903, 908 (9t' Cir. 1996) [internal quotations omitted].
57 Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993).
58 Matter of Salama, III & N Dec. 536 (BIA 1966).
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
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those circumstances, the BIA found that the discrimination was so 'severe
and pervasive' 6 1 to constitute persecution.
Canada
Three federal court decisions from Canada present clear fact patterns
involving discrimination for reasons of religion. In all three, the tribunal
below, the Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD), failed to
find persecution and the cases were brought to the federal court for review.
In only one of the three did the federal court set aside6 2 the tribunal's
denial. The case in which it set the decision aside was Makhlin v. Canada
(M.E.L),6 3 which involved a mixed couple and their daughter from the
Ukraine who took up residence in Israel under that country's Law of
Return. The husband was Jewish and the wife was Russian Orthodox;
they left Ukraine because of anti-Semitism. After spending eight months in
Israel, they arrived in Canada seeking refugee status, stating that as a result
of their mixed marriage they had suffered 'discriminatory treatment and
harassment, and of official indifference, perhaps hostility, towards
them ... ,.64 The CRDD had denied refugee status relying on documen-
tary evidence regarding official freedom of religion in Israel. The federal
court ruled that the CRDD had erred in relying upon this fact, rather than
addressing 'persecution arising from discriminatory actions, without state
protection, directed to them because of their mixed marriage, mixed
because of differences under Israeli law, and practice, of the religious faiths
of the parents and their perceived nationality, the husband as a Jew and
the wife as a Russian'.
65
The federal court took a different approach in a second case involving
religious persecution in Israel. As in Makhlin, the asylum seekers in Barkai v.
M.E.!. 6 6 were also a Jewish husband and his Russian Orthodox wife.
In seeking asylum the couple recounted that the female applicant had
experienced pervasive employment discrimination. 67 When she sought
61 The decision in Matter of Salama was discussed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Gha y, 58
F.3d 1425, 1431 (91h Cir. 1995). The court characterized Matter of Salama as presenting the kind of
'extraordinary' circumstances in which discrimination will be found to constitute persecution. Ghaly, 58
F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995).
62 When the Federal Court of Canada determines that a decision is wrongly made it will 'set aside' or
'quash' it and send the case back to the tribunal for a decision consistent with the federal court's review.
63 Makhlin v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) [1995] 76 F.T.R. 71.
64 Ibid., para. 4. The male applicant also based his claim on conscientious objection to military
service in Israel, stating that he did not want to serve due to the 'nature of military action against the
Arab peoples[.]' Ibid., para. 5. The CRDD failed to address this element of the claim, which the
federal court found to be an additional error. Ibid., para. 11.
65 Ibid., at para. 10.
66 Barkai v. M.E.I. [1994] 50 A.C.W.S. 3d 1079; also available on 1994 A.C.W.SJ. LEXIS 74622.
67 She recounted that:
I was very eager to work in Israel and registered with a number of employment agencies and began to
look for a position caring for elderly people. Initially I was often told that home care workers who spoke
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employment other than home care she encountered extreme sexual har-
assment, which was particularly directed against Russian women; on all
occasions the response to her employment searches was negative when she
was identified as a non-Jew.68 She and her husband were afraid to
complain to the police because they had heard of many accounts where
Russians who had complained had been beaten by police officers. In
addition, they themselves had experienced a negative incident when a
police officer had followed the female applicant home and propositioned
her and, when her husband threatened to complain, the 'policeman
replied that it would be useless ... because nobody would defend a Rus-
sian'. 69 The federal court let stand the CRDD's ruling that the 'discrimi-
nation, harassment and humiliation' to which the applicants had been
subjected did not amount to persecution. 70 Notable in the case is the fact
that although the CRDD acknowledged the UNHCR Handbook's guidance
that serious restrictions on the right to earn a livelihood can amount to
persecution, in a ruling demonstrating extreme insensitivity to gender
equality, the CRDD ruled that such was not the case herein because
the applicant's husband could support her.
7 1
The third Canadian case on religious discrimination, Iran Ahmed v.
M.E.. 72 involved an Ahmadi from Pakistan. The Ahmadis, who consider
themselves Muslims, constitute a disfavored religious minority in Pakistan.
In 1984, Pakistan enacted Ordinance XX which added two new sections to
Pakistan's Penal Code providing prison terms and fines to any Ahmadi who
calls himself a Muslim, refers to his or her faith as Islam, or who preaches or
propagates his or her faith by 'visible representations, or in any manner
whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims'.
73
Russian and some English were in demand. However, as soon as they inspected my [internal passport]
and saw that I was notJewish ... they lost interest in my application. I was even told frankly that some
of their clients do not want to hire 'goys'. Barkai v. M.E.L at para. 22.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. at para. 31.
70 Ibid. at para. 26.
71 Barkai v. M.E.I at para. 44.
72 Ahmedv. Minister of Citizenship andImmgration [1997] F.C.T.D. No. IMM-272596; also available on
1997 Fed. Ct. Trial LEXIS 913.
73 Pakistan Penal Code § 298C, quoted in Karen Parker, 'Religious Persecution in Pakistan: The
Ahmadi Case at the Supreme Court' (Los Angeles: International Educational Development, Inc.,
1993), 2, available at (http://www.webcom.com/hrin/parker/ahmadi.html) (visited 5July 2002).
Many of the religion-based cases involve Ahmadis from Pakistan. There has been widespread criticism
of Ordinance XX specifically, and the treatment of Ahmadis in Pakistan generally. For example, the
United Nations Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities stated
that Ordinance XX:
violates the right to liberty and security of the person; the right to freedom from arbitrary arrest and
detention; the right to freedom of thought, expression, conscience and religion; the right of religious
minorities to profess and practice their own religion and the right to an effective legal remedy.
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities res. 1985/21, para. 1:
U.N. doc. E/CN.4/1986/5 at 102, cited in Parker above, 3.
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The asylum seeker in Ifan Ahmed sought protection in Canada, recount-
ing that because of his religion: he was 'taunted and beaten' throughout his
childhood, denied admission to local colleges, fired from his job, arrested
and jailed in 1987 for having written the Kalima on an Ahmadi mosque,
attacked by a Muslim mob in 1991 requiring a week of hospitalization, and
in 1994 successfully defended his home against the attack of a Muslim
mob, members of which he believed would have killed him had they
gained entrance.
74
The CRDD specifically found that the applicant was credible and that
'Pakistan's history of religious intolerance is well-documented and none
of the parties, nor the CRDD, doubt it'. 75 It ruled, however, that the
applicant's past experiences were not persecution, but only amounted to
'harassment and discrimination'. 76 The CRDD found it significant that
although the applicant had been fired from his job he had been able to find
work in the local Ahamdi community. 77 The federal trial court ruled that




Cases from New Zealand are notable in explicitly invoking international
human rights norms in the determination of 'discrimination-as-persecu-
tion' in religion-based claims. There are three decisions of the Refugee
Status Appeals Authority (RSAA) which directly address the issue, and are
representative of the tribunal's approach.
In a decision of the RSAA, Refugee Appeal Number 72350/2000, 79 the
tribunal considered the claim of an Ahmadi from Pakistan. The facts are
similar to those in the Canadian case, Iran Ahmed, discussed above, but
the decision supplies more details than those contained in the Canadian
decision. The applicant in the N.Z. case was from a family that belonged
In 1998, Human Rights Watch reported the following:
Pakistan's so-called blasphemy laws and other legislation regulating religious practice were used to
harass, intimidate and punish religious minorities, particularly Christians and Ahmadis. As ofJuly,
more than 2 000 Ahmadis had been charged with various offenses under the laws. The laws con-
tributed to a climate of violence against these groups. OnJune 19, Ateeq Ahmad Bajwah, an Ahmadi
lawyer and local leader of the Ahmadiyya community, was shot and killed in broad daylight in Vihari,
Punjab. At this writing, no one has been arrested for the murder. On October 10, retired High Court
Justice Ariflqhal Bhatti was shot and killed in his Lahore office. The murder was reportedly committed
by a member of a militant Sunni Muslim organization who was enraged by Justice Bhatti's 1995
decision to acquit two Pakistani Christians accused of blasphemy.
Human Rights Watch World Report 1998, at (http://www.blwti.itgo.com/pakistan%20human%2s0ghts.htn).
74 Ahmed v. Al. C. at section I.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid. at section I.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid. at section V.
79 Refugee Appeal No. 72350/2000 (2001).
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to the Ahmadi faith going back three generations. He grew up in
Rabwah, the only predominantly Ahmadi town in Pakistan. On two
occasions, he left Rabwah in attempts to pursue a higher education. On
both occasions, he suffered beatings and threats by fellow students, and
received no assistance from the college authorities or the police. 80 He
also had employment difficulties; through friends of his family, he was
able to secure a menial position, but aspired to 'obtain a better job with
better qualifications' 8 1 which he was not able to do in Rabwah because
of limited opportunities there. In addition to the discrimination he
suffered in education and employment, he was assaulted in the vicinity
of an Ahmadi mosque under circumstances that led him to believe it
was because of his Ahmadi faith. 82 The RSAA ruled that cumula-
tively the discrimination he encountered did not rise to the level of
persecution. 8 3
In an earlier decision, Refugee Appeal Number 1039/93,84 the RSAA had
examined the issue of discrimination for reasons of religion, and its inter-
section with rights to privacy and family. The case involved a mixed couple
from Malaysia. Under Malay law a Moslem can only marry within his faith.
The male applicant was Moslem by birth and could not renounce Islam
without severe consequences, 85 while his wife was Buddhist. They had met
in Malaysia, but aware of the prohibition on inter-religious marriage, had
come to New Zealand, married and sought asylum there.86 If they had
remained in Malaysia, their options would have been: 1) the wife's conver-
sion to Islam, which she opposed, especially due to its gender-related
restrictions; 2) co-habitation without marriage, exposing them to jail or a
fine,8 7 depriving the female applicant of marital rights and rendering any
children born illegitimate.88 In finding that the discrimination did rise to the
level of persecution, the RSAA found it significant that freedom of thought
conscience and religion is a non-derogable and 'first hierarchy' right,"'
80 Ibid. at para. 16-17.
81 Ibid. at para. 18.
82 Ibid. at para. 19.
83 Refugee AppealNo. 72350/2000 at para. 51.
84 Refgee Appeal No. 1039/93 (1995).
85 The applicants 'gave evidence that it would not be possible for [the husband] to renounce Islam
as the procedures prescribed in Malaysia are extremely difficult and the would-be apostate encounters
hostility and bureaucratic obstruction'. Ibid. at 4.
86 Ibid. at 2-4.
87 Ibid. at 4.
88 Ibid. at 12.
89 Ibid. at 11. James C. Hathaway's suggested framework for defining persecution incorporates a
human-rights based hierarchy of rights; the more fundamental the right, the stronger the presumption
that its violation constitutes persecution. Using the UDHR and the ICCPR as his framework, Prof.
Hathaway attributes first hierarchy status to non-derogable rights, second hierarchy to binding but
derogable rights; third hierarchy to UDHR rights which are carried forward in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESC) and fourth hierarchy to rights in the
UDHR, which are not codified in the ICCPR or ICESC. Hathaway, n. 9 above, 109-11.
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and that in this case the other significant rights of privacy and family were
implicated. 90 The RSAA also ruled that the benefit of the doubt was to
apply to the determination of 'whether ... discrimination ... crosses the
threshold to persecution',1
In RefugeeAppeal Number 70165/96,92 the RSAA again considered a case
of discrimination for reasons of religion in Malaysia. The applicants were
of Indian ethnicity and Catholic faith. Their claim was based primarily on
the employment discrimination the male applicant had experienced
and policies affecting their children's religious education - namely, that
Christian religious education was no longer available at state schools, that
their children were encouraged to learn Arabic so they could read the
Koran, and that they were teased by Muslim students. 93 The RSAA
invoked the UNHCR Handbook provisions and found that there were not
'consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature' where the male appli-
cant was always able to work, that the children could secure
Christian religious instruction at home and at church, and that therefore
the cumulative measures did not constitute persecution.
9 4
United Kingdom
One case from the United Kingdom, Moezzi v. Secretary of State,95 directly
raises the issue of discrimination as persecution; it presents facts similar to
those in the first of the New Zealand cases dealing with couples of mixed
religion from Malaysia discussed above. Moezzi was an Iranian who
married an Indian national of the Hindu faith. If the applicant's wife did
not abandon her faith, the marriage would not be recognized and their
child would be treated as illegitimate. 96 The Court of Appeal dismissed
Moezzi's appeal, upholding the Secretary of State's ruling that this was 'a
risk of discrimination as compared with a risk of persecution'. 97 Unfortu-
nately there is no analysis to indicate what criteria the Court may have
considered in reaching that conclusion.
The decisions in this section represent a range of approaches. The New
Zealand decisions make a contribution in highlighting the utility of
90 Refugee Appeal No. 1039/93 at 12. Art. 17 of the ICCPR provides:
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference.
Pursuant to Prof. Hathaway's framework, the rights of privacy and family are second hierarchy in that
they are binding, but derogable.
9' Refugee Appeal No. 1039/93 at 13.
92 Refugee Appeal No. 70165/96 (1997).
93 Ibid. at 4.
94 Ibid. at 6.
95 Moezzi v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (6 Oct. 1988) (C.A.), available at (http://
www.lexis.com) (visited 12July 2002).
96 Ibid. at 3.
97 Ibid. at 4.
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considering whether discrimination related to religion also implicates
other protected rights. However, it is not suggested in this paper that the
New Zealand approach be the sole dispositive test as to when discrimina-
tion constitutes persecution. It is suggested, and set forth below, that the
New Zealand approach supplement the guidance in UNHCR Handbook
paragraphs 54 and 55 as follows:
" An analysis of discrimination in religion-based claims should have as
its point of departure the principle that pursuant to international
norms, any form of discrimination on the basis of religion is
impermissible.
" In determining whether discrimination for reasons of religion
constitutes persecution, the guidance in UNHCR Handbook paragraphs
54 and 55 should be applied. UNHCR Handbook paragraph 54 looks to
whether the 'measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a
substantially prejudicial nature for the person concerned' and give
the examples of 'serious restrictions on [the] right to earn liveli-
hood ... [and] access to normally available educational facilities'.
" An additional factor that should be considered is whether the
discriminatory measures have the effect of seriously limiting the
individual from fulfilling his or her human potential (that is, where an
individual is able to earn a livelihood, but does so in a situation of
being consigned to menial work regardless of higher qualifications).
" Where the discriminatory measures implicate other fundamental
protected rights, such as the right to family or privacy, there shall be a
presumption that they constitute persecution.
Serious Physical Harm; Persecution Distinguished from Discrimination
Although in several of the cases in the preceding section, the discriminatory
measures were accompanied by physical harm, the claims centered more
on the non-physical harms (that is, the limits on education, employment,
marriage rights, etc.) and the interpretive issues involved in determining
when discrimination rises to the level of persecution. In this section the
focus shifts to cases where serious physical harm, and other threats against
the physical integrity of the individual constituted the core of the claim. A
survey of the cases reveals that tribunals often characterize physical harms
as 'mere discrimination' or 'harassment'. This characterization has pre-
cluded protection in that neither discrimination nor harassment are suffi-
cient to establish a claim for protection; persecution is required.
United States
In a number of decisions, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled
that serious physical harm constituted harassment or discrimination, but
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did not rise to the level of persecution. Although these decisions were
subsequently reversed on appeal, they are significant for illustrating a
troubling confusion between the terms discrimination and persecution.
For example in Korablina v. INS, 98 the BIA upheld the denial of asylum
to a Jewish applicant from the Ukraine, characterizing the harm she
suffered as discrimination, not persecution. Because of her religion, the
applicant, Vera Korablina, had been limited in her educational and
employment opportunities, had been fired from work, received numerous
anti-Semitic telephone calls and notes threatening to kill her, and on one
occasion was tied up with a noose placed around her neck, which left her
'barely breathing and in a state of shock' requiring hospital treatment for a
brain concussion. 99 All of this occurred in an environment in which other
Jews had been beaten, subject to extortion, and disappeared after going to
the authorities.1 0 0 After Ms Korablina fled the Ukraine her husband was
beaten while being subjected to anti-Semitic epithets, and her daughter
was attacked and threatened with rape under the same circumstances. 101
In reversing the BIA's denial, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that a single specific threat on an applicant's life, in conjunction with other
relevant evidence regarding country conditions would be sufficient to
establish primafacie eligibility, and that in Ms Korablina's case there had
been far more than a single threat.
10 2
Canada
Decisions in Canada at the administrative level (CRDD), appear to
demonstrate the same failure as the U.S. BIA to distinguish properly
between discrimination and persecution. Joda v. Canada (M.E.I.)23 is
98 Korablina v. LAS 158 F.3d 1038 (9 th Cir. 1998).
99 Ibid. at 1042.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid. at 1042-43.
102 Korablina v. INS at 1045. Other federal circuit courts of appeals have appeared to adopt a
position closer to that of the BIA than of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in evaluating whether
serious physical harm rises to the level ofpersecution, althouh these cases were ultimately decided on
other issues. See, for example, Kossov v. INS, 132 F.3d 405 (7 Cir. 1998) where the asylum applicant
claimed asylum from both Latvia and Russia, and the Seventh Circuit ruled that if it were only from
Latvia the court would most likely uphold the BIA's denial (Kossov v. LAS at 408) notwithstanding the
fact that in Latvia the applicant had been 'threatened by police, detained, interrogated, fired from her
two jobs, had bank accounts mysteriously closed ... lost her business and her home' and on one
occasion had been beaten by government agents until she miscarried her unborn child while the agents
taunted her about her Evangelical Christian beliefs. Kossov v. INS at 409. Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399 (7 
h
Cir. 1997) involved the claim of a Romanian Jehovah's Witness who applied for asylum after there
were changed conditions in his country, such that he would have to establish 'severe' past persecution
in order to be granted relief. The court characterized as 'mild' the harm he had suffered, which
included being forbidden to practice his religion, being subjected to threats and beatings throughout
his school years, being 'beaten, starved and tortured' for attempting to escape, and subsequently being
keqt under surveillance and arrested and beaten on a number of occasions. Bucur v. LAS at 404.
03 loda v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) [1993] 65 F.T.R. 166.
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illustrative of this characterization of physical assaults as discrimination.
Ioda involved the claim of a Latvian Catholic married to a Jew from
Belorussia, who suffered harm at the hands of Russians and Latvians
alike after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. 104 The wife was beaten,
received more than fifty anonymous threatening notes; she and her hus-
band lost their employment, their son was beaten on several occasions, and
their home was defaced with anti-Semitic graffiti. 105 The Refugee Division
had ruled that what the family had experienced were 'unpleasant inci-
dents'; that the incidents evinced 'discrimination and prejudice' but did
not constitute persecution, even considered cumulatively.'06 The Federal
Court allowed the application for appeal, noting the importance of con-
sidering the beatings of the son, the anti-Semitic vandalism, and the
impact the hostile social climate had on the couple's ability to work.' 7
United Kingdom
The case of Doudetski v. Secretary of State' 0 8 was also a claim involving serious
physical harm in a climate of hatred and prejudice in which the higher
tribunal (the Immigration Appeal Tribunal) reversed the erroneous finding
of the first adjudicator on the issue of whether serious physical harm
constituted persecution.
The applicant was a citizen of Russia whose father wasJewish. Because
of his Jewish origin, he had been subject to a life-time of discrimination,
assaults and beatings. The most serious incident occurred in 1993 on a
train platform; the applicant was attacked and fell from the platform to the
tracks, losing consciousness. 109 In ruling that he did not qualify for protec-
tion, the Special Adjudicator stated that 'he was not satisfied that the past
treatment and the severity of the attacks ... were sufficient to constitute
past persecution ... or to indicate a reasonable likelihood of future attacks
amounting to persecution by reason of their severity and/or frequency'. 110
As an alternative basis, the Special Adjudicator ruled that the applicant did
not have a well-founded fear because under current country conditions
the state authorities provided adequate protection."' The Immigration
Appeal Authority ruled that the Special Adjudicator had erred on both the
104 As will be discussed in Part 3.4.3.6, claims involving religion often implicate overlapping
grounds. This case implicated issues of religion and nationality, and the Federal Court suggested
that the 'particular social group' ground was appropriate given the factor of the mixed marriage. Ioda v.
Canada at para. 16.
105 Ibid. at para. 3.
106 loda v. Canada at para. 6.
107 Ibid. at para. 14-15.
108 Doudestski v. Secretay of Statefor the Home Department (29June 2000) (I.A.T.); available at Electronic
Immigration Network (http://www.ein.org.uk/index.htmt) (visited 18July 2002).
109 Ibid. at para. 5.
110 Ibid. at para. 11.
I Ibid. at para. 12.
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finding of no persecution and of adequate state protection, and allowed the
appeal. 1
12
In the three cases described herein (which are not unrepresentative of
other decisions from these States), the adjudicator at the earlier level of
decision-making concluded that physical assaults and beatings, carried out
in a climate of hatred and prejudice, did not amount to persecution. In all
three cases the error was corrected by a higher tribunal. However, the fact
that such decisions could be made underscores the need for additional
guidance where physical harm is involved. The UNHCR Handbook, para-
graph 51, recommends that an inference of persecution always arises from
a threat to life or freedom.'1 3 The following proposal incorporates the
spirit of Handbook paragraph 51, as well as other relevant authority on
the issue, namely that: Serious harm in the form of an assault or attack on the
physical integrity of an individual is presumed to constitute persecution,
and the presumption of persecution applies even if the harm was not
repetitive or ongoing.
Limitations or Restrictions on Religion; When do Such Limitations or Restrictions
Constitute Persecution?
As discussed in Part 2.2.2, freedom of religion or belief protects private as
well as public manifestation of belief. The former is absolute, and the latter
is subject only to narrow limitations. Numerous religion-based claims for
protection arise out of violations in the form of limitations or restrictions
on private belief or public manifestation. In determining these claims, the
issue for the adjudicator is whether the limitations or restrictions constitute
persecution.
As the cases discussed in this section illustrate, limitations or restrictions
may range from total bans on specific religions to prohibitions on specified
activities by the religion's adherents. Proselytizing is the most common
activity to be limited or restricted. The impact of a total ban may not
always be considered by tribunals to constitute persecution; in such cases,
the issue arises as to whether the individual could still practice by doing so
privately or in secret. In cases involving limitations on specific practices -
such as proselytizing- the tribunals evaluate whether such restrictions are
of sufficient gravity to be considered persecution. Although the tribunals
reviewed for this section often - but not always - reached decisions in
harmony with international norms, they did not appear to have a consis-
tent approach, based on a clear understanding of the applicant's religion,
and the importance of particular practices.
112 Ibid. at para. 25.
113 , M1t may be inferred that a threat to life or freedom on account of [the Convention grounds] is
always persecution'. UHCR Handbook, n. 22 above, para. 51.
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A restriction on religious practice which was noted in Part 3.1.2.1
above, is that imposed on the Ahmadis in Pakistan. It bears mentioning
at this point that in none of the countries surveyed are the limits on
Ahmadi practice (that is, forbidding them from identifying themselves as
Muslim, referring to their faith as Islam, preaching or proselytizing in any
way) considered per se persecutory such that the asylum seeker would not
have to show additional facts in order to qualify for protection.
United States
It is well-accepted in principle in U.S. law that a total ban on religion
constitutes persecution. 114 However, there are very few U.S. decisions
actually decided on the basis of a total ban, or on the existence of restric-
tions or limitations. Cases relevant to the issue include Doe v. L)VS, 115 where
the court remanded a case back to the Board for further consideration
finding evidence of eligibility on the basis of the well-documented restric-
tions on unofficial religions in China; Hartooni v. INS,' 16 referring to the
persecution of Armenian Christians in Iran where their schools were
closed, their churches stoned, and they were prohibited from celebrating
Christmas; and Dhine v. LYS, 1 17 describing the persecution of Jews in
Ethiopia as including closing their religious schools and confiscating their
religious materials.
Canada
Five Canadian cases have directly involved limitations and restrictions on
practice. Three cases, Fosu v. Canada,'1 8 Okyere-Akosah v. MEL,' 19 and
Impugge, Mendis and QOu v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration12 o involved
total or near-total bans. In Fosu the government of Ghana suspended the
public activities of the Mormons and the Jehovah's Witnesses.12' When
the applicant, a Jehovah's Witness, attempted to study the Bible at the
home of a fellow church member, he was arrested- subsequently his home
was searched and religious materials confiscated. 1 2 The Federal Court of
114 Bucur v. INS, 109 F.3d 399, at 405 (7th Cir. 1997) ('it is virtually the definition of religious
persecution that the votaries of a religion are forbidden to practice it').115 Doe v. INS, 867 F.2d 285 (6th Cir 1989).
116 Hartooniv. IMS, 21 F.3d 336, 341 (9th Cir. 1994).117 Dhine v. INS, 818 F. Supp 671, 674 (SDNY 1993) (reversed on other grounds by 3 F.3d 613 (2d
Cir. 1993)).
118 Fosu v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration) [1994] 90 F.T.R. 182.
119 Okyere-Akosahv.M.E.L [1992] 33A.C.W.S. (3d) 1119; also available at 1992 A.C.W.SJ. LEXIS
32486.
120 Iripugge, Mendis & Qu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2000] Docket: IMM-
2784-98; IMM-2969-98; IMM-2089-98 available at (http://decisions/fc-cf.gc.ca) (visited 13June 2002).
121 Fosu v. Canada, at para. 2.
122 Ibid.
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Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the Refugee Division had not
properly evaluated whether the restrictions constituted persecution when it
had simply concluded that the restrictions were 'entirely different from
banning someone to [sic] pray God or to study the Bible'. 1 23
Okyere-Akosah also involved a claim from Ghana. The applicant was a
member of the Council of Elders in the Nyame Sompa Church, a Protes-
tant church. The church was banned, members were arrested, and
government agents came to the applicant's house searching for him.124
The Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board
had not considered 'the totality of evidence' when it found the facts
insufficient to support a claim of religious persecution. 125
Irpugge, similar to the U.S. Doe decision, arose out of China's prohibi-
tion on unofficial religious practice. The applicant, Mao Chun Qiu,
testified that he worshipped secretly in order to avoid arrest. 126 The
CRDD had ruled that since Mr Qui could practice (by doing it in secret)
he had not been persecuted. 127 The Federal Court quashed the decision,
finding it to be incorrect.
12 8
Kassatkine v. Canada129 raised the issue of the prohibition of proselytiz-
ing. 130 The asylum seekers were evangelical Baptists in Moldova. Their
religion required public proselytism, which was forbidden under
Moldovan law. 13 1 The Federal Court quashed the decision denying relief,
stating that: 'A law which requires a minority of citizens to breach the
principles of their religion, to be lifelong outlaws, is patently persecutory.
One might add, so long as those religious tenets are not unreasonable as,
for example, exacting human sacrifice or the taking of prohibited drugs as
-- , 132 -
a sacrament.
In Abdul Majid Butt v. Canada, 13 3 a ruling which appears inconsistent with
Kassatkine, if not wholly perverse, the Federal Court declined to quash
a decision denying refugee protection to an Ahmadi from Pakistan.
In addition to Ordinance XX, there was documentary evidence that
the Ahmadi community had been 'harassed and persecuted' 3 and the
123 Ibid. at para. 2-5.
124 Okyere-Akoah v. MEL. at para. 1.
125 Ibid. at para. 14.
126 Iripugge, Mendis, & Qzu v. Canada at para. 46.
127 Ibid. at para. 48.
128 Ibid. at paras. 51, 55.
129 Kassatkine v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1996] 65 A.C.W.S. (3d) 480; also
available at 1996 A.C.W.SJ. LEXIS 140265.
130 It also raised the issue of religiously motivated conscientious objection, but that will be discussed
in Part 3.4.3.1.
131 Kassatkine v. Canada at para. 5.
132 Ibid. at para. 10.
133 Butt v. Canada (Solicitor General) [1993] 42 A.C.W.S. (3d) 873; also available at 1993 A.C.W.SJ.
LEXIS 49451.
134 Ibid. at 2.
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applicant, described in the decision as a 'devout Ahmadi Muslim' testified
that he and his family had suffered 'incidents of discrimination and
attacks'.135 In ruling that the restrictions did not constitute persecution,
the CRDD held that Ordinance XX: 'does not prohibit or condemn the
Ahmadis, but only restrict their acts of worship and religious belief.' 3 6
New Zealand
Six decisions in New Zealand have involved either total bans or limi-
tations/restrictions on practice. In four of the cases, relief was granted;
in two it was denied because the restrictions were not considered
unreasonable.
The case raising the issue of a total ban was Refugee Appeal Number 300/
92,137 which involved an Iranian who had become a member of the Hare
Krishna movement, forbidden in Iran. In finding for the claimant, the
tribunal referred to the fact that '[i] t is the . .. total inability to practise his
religion which distinguishes this case from those where the practice of a
religion is possible, but subject to the qualification that proselytizing is
forbidden'. 138
The New Zealand tribunals have granted protection in some cases
where the individuals would be at risk of persecution if they proselytized,
but not if they kept their religious beliefs to themselves. For example, it
ruled in favor of Christians from Iran where the 'particular faith which
the family have embraced is one which is, by Christian terms, particularly
zealous and which apparently encourages proselytising'. 139 It also found
for a Baptist from Iran where the applicant has a 'pre-disposition to discuss
her faith with others', 140 and for an ethnic Korean Christian from China
who was 'the kind of individual who is likely to become involved in
proselytising his religion ... , it being his deeply held belief that it was
the "will of God" to promote such teachings'. 141
In two other cases some degree of limitation - on proselytizing, or on
activities more broadly defined than proselytizing - have not been found
to constitute persecution. In an Ahmadi case from New Zealand discussed
above in Part 3.1.2.1, the tribunal quoted from an earlier decision in
135 Ibid. at 2-3.
136 Ibid. at 3.
137 Refigee Appeal No. 300/92 (1994), available at (http://www.refiigee.org.nz/csearch.htm) (visited
19june 2002).
138 Ibid. at 3 [emphasis in original].
139 Refugee Appeal No. 70720/97 (1998), available at (http://www.nzrefugeeappeal.govt.nz/default.asp)
(visited 26July 2002), at 9.140 Refugee Appeal ANo. 71066/98 (1999), available at (http://www.nzrfugeeappeals.govt.nz/default.asp)
(visited 26July 2002), at 7.141 Refugee Appeal No. 70692/97 (1998), available at (http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/default.asp)
(visited 26July 2002), at 22.
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noting that it had consistently held that although 'Ahmadis were subjected
to restrictions in the way that they were permitted to manifest their
religion ... they were not prevented from practising their religion'.
14 2
The RSAA implied that Pakistan's restrictions on Ahmadis might not be
violative of freedom of religion, but were permissible pursuant to Article
18.3 of the ICCPR.
143
In another case, 144 involving an applicant from Bangladesh who
claimed 14 5 to have converted to a Pentecostal or Evangelical faith, with
the obligation to 'spread Christianity', 146 the RSAA again invoked Article
18.3, ruling 'We do not consider that it would be unreasonable for him to
accept a restraint against proselytizing activities as Article 8(3) of the
[ICCPR] itself qualifies the "right" to freedom of religion
United Kingdom
The U.K. position on the issue has evolved since its earliest decision,
Atibo v. Immigration Officer.14 8 Atibo involved a Mozambican from a Mos-
lem family who had converted to the Pentecostal church, and become an
assistant pastor in his home country. 14 9 Proselytizing, particularly by
adherents of protestant and evangelical churches, was restricted.
Without engaging in an analysis of the importance of proselytizing
within the applicant's religion, or to him personally in his role as
assistant pastor, the adjudicator refused the claim, and the IAT affirmed
that decision. 151
142 Refugee Appeal No. 72350/2000 (2001), available at (http://www.nzrefiugeeappeals.govt.nz/default.asp)
(visited 26July 2002), at para. 44.
143 The RSAA quoted its earlier decision:
While it is difficult to define the precise motives behind the passing of Pakistan's Ordinance XX of
1984 it appears clear from all the country information that is available that any attempts to propagate
or manifest the Ahmadi religion in Pakistan in the face of the overwhelming Sunni Moslem majority is
likely to provoke breaches of the peace and is likely in the minds of that majority to be detrimental to
their fundamental rights in relation to their religion ....
We are unable to find that the restriction upon the manifestation of Ahmadi religion in Pakistan
amounts to persecution given the social conditions prevailing there and given the qualification imposed
by Article 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights on the right to freedom of
religion. Ahmadis are not forbidden to practise their religion.
Refgee Appeal No. 72350/2000 at para. 46.
:4 RefugeeAppeal Ao. 10/92 (1992), available at (http://www.refiugee.org.nz) (visited 19June 2002).145 There were questions of credibility regarding the conversion, but for the purposes of its ana-
lysis of the limits on proselytizing, the RSAA assumed the conversion to be genuine. Refugee Appeal No.
10/92 at 9.
46 Refugee Appeal No. 10/92 at 9.
47 Ibid.
148 Atibo v Immigration Officer, London (Heathrow) Airport, TH/23674/78(1162) [1978] Imm AR 93; also
available at (http://www.lexis.com).
149 Ibid. at 2.
150 Ibid. at 4.
151 Ibid. at 6.
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In Ahmad v. Secretay of State,152 which involved the claim for asylum of
Ahmadis from Pakistan subject to Ordinance XX, the Court of Appeal
ruled that generally individuals could not qualify for protection if they
intentionally violated laws regarding restrictions on their religious practice:
'a person cannot obtain refugee status on the basis that he has a fear of
persecution if he returns to his national country and proceeds to break its
laws'. 153 The Court [FarquharsonJ] qualified this rule by reference to the
characteristics of the particular claimant, and of the limiting law, acknowl-
edging that 'a priest may be different from that of an ordinary member of
the community, or the offending statute itself may be so draconian that it
would be impossible to practise the religion at all'. 154 On the facts of the
case, the Court of Appeal refused the claim.
In a subsequent case, the Court of Appeal again considered the prohibi-
tion on Ahmadis in Pakistan. 15 5 The claim involved the ban on proselytiz-
ing in the context of an internal flight alternative.' 56 The applicant had
been severely persecuted in his village for his religion, 157 and he testified
that if he returned and relocated, he would not stop speaking out; that 'he
would still follow the command of his spiritual leaders and would still be
vocal in his proclamation of Ahmadi beliefs'.' 58 The IAT had refused on
this basis, ruling that he had an internal flight alternative if he refrained
from proselytizing or speaking out about his beliefs. The Court of Appeal
disagreed and ruled that even if it was 'unreasonable' 159 for the applicant to
continue speaking out, he was entitled to protection if speaking out resulted
152 Ahmad and Others v. Secretary of Statefor the Home Department [1990] Imm AR 61 (CA); also available
at (http://www.lexis.com).
Ahmad v. Secretagy of State, at 5.
153 Ibid.
154 Ahmed (ftPihar) v. Secretary of Statefor the Home Department [2000] I.N.L.R. I (CA); also available at
1999 WL 1071271.
155 Ahmed (1fifkhar) v. Secretary of Statefor the Home Department [2000] I.N.L.R. I (CA); also available at
1999 WL 1071271.
156 The principle of internal flight alternative (IFA) is discussed in Part 3.2.2.2; it provides that
an individual who could avoid persecution by reasonably relocating within the country of feared
persecution does not have a well-founded fear of persecution.
157 The persecution was not minor; the case recounts that: '[W]hilst living in the village Khivewali
which has about three thousand inhabitants he was on a daily basis subjected to harassment and a
degree of physical violence including being spat at and stones being thrown at him ... he and his
family were subjected to the most appalling treatment. His house was attacked and burned down on at
least one if not two occasions'.
Ahmed v. Secretary of State at 2.
158 Ahmed v. Secretary of State at 3.
159 Although they were decided on other issues, two additional cases included language regarding
this controversy over the measures that an asylum seeker might be expected to take in order to avoid
persecution. For example, in rasmin v. Secretar, of Statefor the Home Department, [1999] EWCA Civ 1633,
also available at (http://www.bailii.org) the IAT referred to the fact that 'most Ahmadis find it
strategically advisable to maintain the lowest possible profile' and that the applicant in this case, a
middle-aged woman, could avoid persecution because she would likely 'remain within the confines of
her home'. Ibid. at 3. Her attorney had objected to this aspect of the ruling, arguing that 'there is no duty
imposed upon an asylum seeker to keep a low profile in exercising the fundamental human right of
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in a risk of persecution. 160 The fact that the asylum seeker had suffered the
consequences of being faithful to his beliefs in the past was significant to the
Court, which found his assertions that he would continue toproselytize and
speak out it to be highly credible, rather than self-serving.
Under international norms protecting the right to freedom of religion
or belief, the manifestation of belief may only be limited or restricted
in carefully circumscribed and narrow circumstances. As detailed in Part
2.2.2, Article 18.3 of the ICCPR sets forth specific and exhaustive criteria;
limitations are permitted only when 'prescribed by law and ... necessary
to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights
and freedoms of others'. 162 In determining whether limitations or restric-
tions are persecution, therefore, tribunals should keep in mind the strong
preference towards unfettered practice, as well as the specific criteria of
Article 18.3. A serious question is raised by language in several decisions
which appears to imply that the existence of bias and prejudice towards a
religion might constitute a sufficient Article 18.3 basis for limiting mani-
festation of the disfavored religion or belief. 1
63
In addition, in determining whether requiring an individual to refrain
from a religious activity is persecution or not, the tribunal must be
particularly cognizant of the significance of that activity within a particular
religion, as well as its significance to the particular adherent. Several of the
decisions from New Zealand and the U.K. appear to adopt this approach
(although it does not appear to be evenly applied), which is elaborated
upon in the following recommendation:
" Internationally accepted norms on freedom of religion or belief should
inform the determination whether limitations or restrictions constitute
persecution.
" ICCPR 18.3 prohibits limitations or restrictions which are not
prescribed by law and necessary for public safety, order, health or
morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
freedom of conscience and religion[.]' Ibid. at 4. Because the appeal was refused for other reasons, the
Court of Appeal did not directly address itself to this argument.
In R v. Secretay of State for the Home Department, ex parte Arshad [2000] (CA), available at (http://
www.exis.com) (visited 12 July 2002), the Special Adjudicator had ruled that the applicant could
avoid persecution if he took 'sensible precautions along the lines of those which he has adopted in
the past not to provoke trouble'. Ibid. at 2. The measures taken by the asylum seeker included fleeing
from his hometown of Rabwah to escape arrest, living with a relative in Faisalabad, and then moving
to Lahore and using a false name. Ibid. at 1. The Court of Appeal did not reach the issue as to whether
it was reasonable to expect him to continue living in that manner to avoid persecution because it had
not been properly raised as a procedural matter.
160 Ahmed v. Secretary of State at 7.
161 Ahmed v. Secretay of State at 6-7.
162 ICCPR, n. I above.
163 See, for example, Refugee Appeal No. 72350/2000 (2001) para. 46, quoted n. 142 above, in which
the court appeared to justify limits on the Ahamdis in Pakistan because of Sunni Moslem hostility
towards the Ahmadis.
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" A presumption that the limitation or restriction constitutes persecu-
tion arises from the fact that such limitation or restriction would not
be permitted subject to ICCPR Article 18.3. Additional factors that
should be considered in determining whether the limitations or
restrictions rise to the level of persecution should include:
- the importance or centrality of the particular act within the
religion; and
- the subjective importance of the act to the individual given her
history and background.
The more central the act, or the more important to the individual,
the more likely that limitations or restrictions upon it rise to the
level of persecution.
* The issue of importance or centrality of an act to a particular religion
would be greatly assisted by the testimony of experts on the particular
religion at issue, while the issue of importance to the individual
requires an inquiry into the details of the applicant's beliefs and
practice.
Forced Compliance with Religious Norms; Wen does it Constitute Persecution?
In many religion-based claims the persecution complained of is being
coerced or otherwise forced to comply with religious norms not of the
individual's choosing. When does such forced compliance constitute
persecution? Because cases of forced compliance increasingly arise
in gender asylum claims, this issue will be addressed below in Part
3.4.3.3.
3.1.2.2 Non-State Agents/Failure of State Protection
As discussed in Part 3.1.1, although they are in the clear minority, there
are State parties to the Convention that do not provide protection to
victims of non-state agents unless the State is in some way complicit with
the persecution. This complicity or accountability approach poses a sig-
nificant obstacle to protection in that non-state actors are very frequently
the perpetrators of religious persecution, in situations where the State is
not complicit, but is simply not able to provide protection. 
164
None of the four countries surveyed for purposes of this paper subscribe
to the complicity approach, but instead look to whether there has been a
failure of State protection against persecution by non-state agents. Within
that context, however, there are some tribunal decisions - most notably
164 Reports of the U.N. Special Rapporteur have consistently noted the rise in intolerance
and discrimination at the hands of non-state actors. See, for example, E/CN.4/2000/65, n. 7
above, para. 173; A/53/279, n.7 above, para. 85(c).
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from New Zealand - which are more consistent with the rationale under-
lying the 'protection' view than others. For instance, the RSAA in New
Zealand has held that where the police themselves have been involved in
the persecutory acts, there is 'no question' of receiving police protection,
that is, there is a failure of State protection. 165 In another case the New
Zealand tribunal noted that it would apply the benefit of the doubt
principle in determining whether the State could protect the applicant in
the two locations relevant to her claim (New Delhi and Kashmir). 16
6
In contrast to this approach is a U.K. decision where, notwithstanding
police participation in the persecution, the tribunal held that there had
been no failure of State protection. 167 The applicant in Ehsan Hamid had
converted from Sunni Muslim to Ahmadi. He experienced threats of
violence and hostility, was forced out of business, and was ultimately
arrested on the basis of false charges. While he was in police custody he
was assaulted and beaten. 168 The Special Adjudicator ruled that there was
'no police or official harassment' and that his beatings while in detention
had likely been 'the actions of individual police officers'. 
16 9
Two subsequent decisions from the U.K. have been more protection• • 170
oriented than Ehsan Hamid. In The Queen on the Application of Bodzek, the
High Court ofJustice quashed a decision which had found no failure of
state protection in circumstances where on eight separate occasions the
police had failed to take any action in response to claims of anti-Semitic
attacks against the Jewish Polish applicants. 171 And in Kinuthia v. Secretary of
State,172 the Court of Appeal quashed a decision which had held that the
165 Refugee AppealNo. 71955/2000 (2000), available at (http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/default.asp)
(visited 26July 2002), at para. 28 (involving a Pentecostal Christian in Pakistan). The Federal Court of
Canada applied this same principle when the persecution was at the hand of a police officer's son. See
Annan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1995] 3 F.C. 25, 27; also available at 1995 F.C.
LEXIS 166 (Ghanian woman kidnapped and gang-raped by police inspector's son 'cannot expect
protection from the police since it is the inspector's son who is still pursuing her[.]').
166 RefugeeAppealNo. 80/91 (1992) at 3, available at (http://www.refugee.org.nz/csearch.htin) (visited 19
June 2002).
167 167 R v. Secretay of Statefor Home Department, exparte Ehsan Hamid [1997] EWCA Civ 2612; also
available at (http://www.bailii.org).
168 Ehsan Hamid at 2.
169 Ibid. at 3 (Special Adjudicator's decision upheld by IAT; application forjudicial review denied
by CA).
170 The Qyeen on the Application ofBodzek v. Special Adjudicator [2002] EWHC 1525 (Admin); also
available at (http://www.ein.org.uk/index.htmt) (visited 2 Aug. 2002).
171 Ibid. at 6. The Federal Court in Canada took a similar approach in Haimov v. Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration 2001 FCT 665 (2001) where the Israeli police refused to protect a Russian
Christian Orthodox woman from the brutal domestic violence of herJewish husband. As described in
the opinion, when the wife 'went to the police, the officer started to write a report but tore it up when
he learned the conflict took place because the applicant and her husband were of different religions'.
The court found that the state inability to protect led to presumptions of the well-foundedness of her
fear. Haimov at para. 19.
172 Kinuthia v. Secretay of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 2100; also available at
(htp://www.ein.org.uk/index.htmo (visited 18July 2002).
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availability ofjudicial recourse after abuse by governmental authorities was
sufficient state protection.173 In Iinuthia the applicant had been arrested
for her religious beliefs on four separate occasions and had suffered 'mal-
treatment ... of a serious nature.
17 4
Thus, because of the pervasiveness of religious persecution by non-state
actors, adherence to the accountability view severely limits protection
from religious persecution. In addition, even in States where the protection
view prevails, there can be a serious gap in protection if the adjudicators
improperly determine that there has been State protection, even when
there has been a failure of such protection. Therefore, an interpretive
approach is recommended in which persecution within the meaning of the
Refugee Convention includes persecution by the State as well as persecu-
tion by non-state agents in situations where the State is unwilling or unable
to provide effective protection. Moreover, in cases where State agents
participate in the actual persecutory acts, there is a presumption of a
failure of State protection, which can only be rebutted by a strong showing
of adequate and effective State protection.
3.2 WelI-Founded
3.2.1 The Issue of 'Well-Founded' Fear in Religion-based Claims
The issue of well-founded fear arises in a number of specific areas in
religion-based claims. For example, numerous cases involve asylum see-
kers who suffered past persecution, and raise the issue of the relevance of
past harm to future risk. Because religious persecution may occur in
contexts with polarized and geographically separate communities, the
issue of internal flight alternative often arises. R 5 Other cases focus on
the question of 'mere membership' and whether it is ever sufficient to
establish a claim. At least one case raises the issue of 'safe country' lists and
their relationship to claims of religious persecution.
3.2.2 State Jurisprudence Regarding a Well-Founded Fear
3.2.2.1 The Relevance of Past Persecution to Establishing a Well-Founded
Fear of Future Harm
Because the well-founded fear standard is to be determined on the basis of
country conditions and patterns of persecution, the fact that an individual
173 Ibid. at para. 20.174 Kinu/hia at para. 4.
175 UNHCR Handbook para. 91 provides that an applicant need not establish countrywide persecu-
tion in order to be recognized as a refugee, although the existence of a 'reasonable' internal flight
alternative (IFA) could defeat the claim. UNHCR, Handbook, n. 22 above, para. 91. UNHCR's current
position (which will be included in prospective guidelines on the issue) is that the question of an IFA is
generally only relevant where the agent of persecution is a non-state actor, there is effective state
protection in another part of the country which is physically, safely and legally accessible to the
individual, and relocation would be reasonable under all the circumstances.
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was harmed in the past is relevant to assessing his or her future risk. In the
United States past persecution is considered such a strong indicator of
future risk that there is a regulatory presumption that an individual who
has been persecuted in the past has established a well-founded fear unless
there has been 'a fundamental change in circumstances' in the country, or
the person could avoid future persecution by relocating within the country,
if relocation would be 'reasonable' under all the circumstances. 
176
Although none of the other three States surveyed for this paper have
adopted such a presumption, they generally consider past persecution in
assessing future risk. There are exceptions, and some cases in the United
Kingdom are striking for the fact that they involve repeated and/or serious
past persecution, in situations where there does not appear to have been
any amelioration in country conditions, and yet protection is denied on
failure to establish a well-founded fear. An example of such a decision is
Tahir v. Secretary of State177 in which the Court of Appeal dismissed the
appeal of an Ahmadi husband and wife from Pakistan. The wife was a
doctor and she had been deceived into responding to a night-time emer-
gency call which turned out to be an ambush from which they escaped
after being physically and verbally assaulted. 178 That incident was fol-
lowed by men arriving at their residence and threatening death, which was
then followed by the police coming to their home to arrest them, and,
upon releasing them, giving them orders to report the next day. They fled
at that point, and learned that after their departure, the police were
searching for them since they had failed to report. 179 No well-founded
fear was found on these facts. 80
3.2.2.2 Internal Flight Alternative
In the United States, there are regulations addressing the issue of internal
flight alternative. The regulations are partially consistent with the current
UNHCR position la l in providing that where the persecutor is the
For an in-depth discussion of IFA and related issues, see,Jennifer Moore, 'From Nation State to Failed
State: International Protection from Human Rights Abuses by Non-State Agents' (1999) 31 Columbia
Human Rghts Law Review 81, 103, n. 60.
176 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) and (B).
177 Tahir and Another v. Secretay of State for the Home Department [1995] (CA) available at (http://
www.kxis.com).
178 Ibid. at 2.
179 Tahir at 2-3.
180 Ibid. at 7.
181 See n. 175 above; the UNHCR position is that: a) in cases where persecution is by State agents,
there is a presumption of countrywide persecution and an alternate location is not a relevant
consideration; b) in cases where persecution is by non-state agents, and the State has been unwilling
to protect the claimant in one part of the country, it can be presumed that the State would be
unwilling to extend its protection in any other part of the country; c) to be a relevant alternative, a
potential area of relocation must be physically, safely, and legally accessible to the claimant; d) an
individual may not be denied refugee status merely because he could have relocated to an IFA unless it
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government or government-sponsored, a rebuttable presumption arises
that 'internal relocation would not be reasonable ... '. 82 The regulations
identify relevant criteria for determining whether it is reasonable to expect
an individual to relocate within her country.'
83
The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board has issued guidelines
which adopt a 'reasonableness' standard in assessing the existence of an
IFA.184 Relevant factors include the 'state of infrastructure and economy
in the IFA region ... and the stability or instability of the government that
is in place there'. 185 It is recognized that an individual 'should not be
required to suffer great physical danger or undue hardship in traveling to
an IFA region, or in staying there.
The cases involving religion-based claims demonstrate a varied
approach to assessing the existence and reasonableness of an IFA; some
tribunals are far more diligent than others in examining the particular facts
in determining the question of an IFA. For example, the Federal Court of
Canada rejected the existence of an IFA in Annan v. Canada. 187 In finding
there was no IFA for the Ghanaian asylum seeker, the Court took judicial
notice of the small size of the country, its cultural norms, and the fact that
the twenty-three year old Roman Catholic female applicant did not know
where her parents were.
18 8
The RSAA in New Zealand appears equally diligent in reviewing the
specific facts of the asylum seekers' circumstances in determining an IFA. It
has ruled that where claims based on religion also implicate other Convention
grounds, the IFA must exist for the feared persecution related to each
ground.18 9 In other cases it has held that it would not be reasonable to
would have been reasonable to expect him to do so; e) a determination of the reasonableness of an IFA
requires an examination of all relevant criteria, including whether the individual can enjoy funda-
mental civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights as a citizen (or habitual residence for a
stateless person) in the area of relocation, including economic survival, without facing an undue
hardship; f) if the individual risks being persecuted, including any new form of persecution, it is not
reasonable to expect relocation.
182 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3)(ii).
183 The non-exhaustive list of criteria include: 'ongoing civil strife within the country; adminis-
trative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural con-
straints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties'. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(3). In considering
whether an IFA would be reasonable, UNHCR considers, inter alia, the ability of the individual to enjoy
fundamental civil, political, economic social and cultural rights as a citizen in the area of relocation,
including the ability to survive economically without undue hardship.
184 Canadian Immigration & Refugee Board, Guidelines on Civilian Non-combatants Fearing
Persecution in Civil War Situations (1996), available at (http://eww.irb.gc.ca/en/about/legal/guidline/
civillian/1ADEXE.htm).
185 Ibid. in section entitled 'Internal Flight Alternative'.
186 Ibid.
187 Annan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1995] 3 F.C. 25; also available at 1995
F.C. LEXIS 166.
188 Ibid. at 30-31.189 See, for example, Rfugee Appeal No. 2038/93 (1995), available at (http://www.nzrffigeeappeals.
govt.nz/default.asp) (holding that a Nigerian Christian pastor who was also a pro-democracy activist
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expect an asylum seeker to relocate where he had been detained and
tortured by the police, and suffered trauma and abuse going back to his
childhood. 90 The RSAA has also found that systems of registration which
allow the government to locate an individual also preclude internal reloca-
tion (referring to the propiska system in the Ukraine). 19 1
A recent U.K. decision 9 2 appears to apply a more stringent standard for
asylum seekers claiming there is no IFA. The standard is whether it would
be 'unduly harsh' 19 3 to require the applicant to relocate. The U.K. case
involved an Ahmadi who had lived with his wife in Lahore, Pakistan,
where, because of his religion, his factory had been burned down, he had
been detained by the police, his wife had been terrorized during an attack
on the family home, which resulted in her miscarriage and resulting
inability to bear children, and he had received numerous death threats. 194
Without assessing the applicant's individual circumstances, the Court of
Appeal per StaughtonJ. upheld the special adjudicator's use of the 'unduly
harsh' standard and the ruling that the applicant could relocate in Rabwah
because 'millions of [Ahmadis] live there ... [i]t depends on how they
behave; what they do- and, as far as concerns religion, on the state of their
religious activities'. This decision on IFA is related to the discussion in
Part 3.1.2.1 regarding restrictions on actions; it assumes that the applicant
should limit or restrict the manifestation of religious belief to avoid persecution.
3.2.2.3 Mere Membership
In addressing religion-based claims, the UNHCR Handbook paragraph 73,
notes that '[m] ere membership [in] a particular religious community will
normally not be enough to substantiate a claim to refugee status'. 196 This
guidance has its exceptions; obviously there can be country conditions such
that all members of a particular group would be found to have a well-
founded fear; the situation of ews in Europe during World War II provides
the most obvious example. 197 The application of the general rule that mere
could not avoid persecution by relocating from an Islamic to a Christian majority region, because he
would still be at risk there for his political beliefs and activism). Ibid. at 8.190 Refugee Appeal No. 70222/96 (1997) at 27, available at (http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/
default. asp).191 Refugee Appeal NAo. 70903/98 (1998) at 12-13, available at (http://wwow.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/
default asp).192 R. v. Secretay of State for Home Department and others exparte Rahman [2000] (CA) available at (http://
www.lexis.com). (The unduly harsh text dates from Robinson [1998] QB 929 and the CA was following
LinderJA in Thirunavukkaran 109 DLR (41h) 682 at 687 (F.C. Canada). The CA also proposed following
the E.U. Joint Position; could the applicant reasonably be expected to move.)193 Ibid. at 3.
194 Ibid. at 2-3.
195 Ra man at 3.
196 UNHCR, Handbook, n. 22 above, para. 73.
197 The only tribunal decision which appeared to hold that 'mere membership' was enough on the
facts was Dieguez v. Canada (Mintster of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] Docket: IMM-1021-98
HeinOnline  -- 16 Int'l J. Refugee L. 199 2004
200 Karen Musalo
membership is not enough, however, appears to have led some tribunals to
ignore the particular circumstances in individual cases, 198 or to reach the
mistaken position that where all members of a particular group are perse-
cuted, the applicant must be persecuted to a greater degree in order to
establish a claim. 199 These are both misapplications of the general rule.
3.2.2.4 Safe Country of Origin
A number of European Union member states have written lists of safe
countries of origin; claims for persons whose country of origin is consid-
ered safe are deemed manifestly unfounded, and are generally subject to
accelerated procedures. One decision from the U.K., Secretary of State v.
Javed,2 ° ° makes the important point that countries that may be considered
safe for a certain range of claims, may not be safe for claims based on
religion. Until October of 2000, the U.K. maintained a list of safe coun-
tries, referred to as 'the White List'.2 ° ' Javed involved judicial review of a
decision by the then U.K. Home Office Minister Jack Straw to include
Pakistan on the white list of safe countries. The Court of Appeal ruled that
Mr Straw had erred in law and acted irrationally in including Pakistan on
the list of safe countries. Although the Court of Appeal focused mostly on
the position of women in reaching that decision it also considered the
situation of Ahmadis in reaching its conclusion.20
In sum, the relevance of past persecution to future harm, and the
question of appropriate criteria to apply in cases of internal relocation
available at (http://decisions/fct-cfgc.ca) (visited 13 June 2002), quashing a CRDD decision. Dieguez
involved a Seventh Day Adventist from Cuba. The CRDD had denied because the applicant was able
to attend church, and had not personally had any difficulties. Ibid. at para. 4. In quashing the CRDD
decision, the Federal Court noted that U.S. Department of State reports documented the many
prohibitions and restrictions on religion and religious practice. Ibid. at para. 8.
198 The issue of mere membership comes up frequently in Ahmadi cases where the existence of
Ordinance XX is not found to be per se persecutory such that all Ahmadis have a well-founded fear. In
order to establish a claim, the individual applicant must establish facts of persecution (beyond the
existence of Ordinance XX). However it often appears that even when these facts are marshalled, the
adjudicator invokes the general rule that not all Ahmadis are persecuted in Pakistan as a means of
ignoring the individual facts of the case. See, for example, Ghafoor KIhan v. Secretay of State for the Home
Department [1999] EWCA Civ 1638 (CA), available at (http://www.bailii.org) (Court of Appeal refused
application of Ahmadi threatened by police with arrest if he did not change his religion because 'there
can be no blanket recognition of [Ahmadis] as refugees'). Ibid. at 4.
199 See Chen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immgration) [1997] Court File No. IMM-1433-96,
available at 1997 Fed. Ct. Trial LEXIS 696 (where Federal Court set aside the CRDD's decision
that the Chinese applicant, who faced a 'short detention, fine, or re-education term' did not have a
well-founded fear because he was not at more risk than others in his same situation). Ibid. at 5.
200 Secretay of Statefor the Home Department v. javed, Ali, and Ali [2002] (CA) Appeal No. C-2001-0291,
available at (http://www.ein.org.uk/index.htm) (visited 2 Aug. 2002).
201 Ibid. at 2.
202 Ibid. at 2 1. In Islam &Shah [1999] 2 AC 629 a number ofthe Law Lords were prepared to hold
that all Pakistani women were members of a particular social group based on the entrenched gender
discrimination in that society.
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are the two principal issues related to 'well-foundedness' of fear which
could benefit from the articulation of an analytical approach consistent
with the commitment to protection for freedom of religion and belief.
Adoption of the U.S. approach for the former, and a combination of the
New Zealand and the UNHCR approach for the latter would result in
improved protection. The necessary recommendation to implement such
change follows.
" An individual who has suffered past persecution is presumed to have a
well-founded fear of persecution, absent a showing of changed
circumstances sufficient to negate the presumption.
" In cases where persecution is by State agents, it is presumed that
persecution is statewide and an alternate location is not a relevant
consideration.
* In cases where persecution is by non-state agents, it can also be
presumed that if the State is unwilling to protect the claimant in one
part of the country, it would also be unwilling to extend its protection
in other areas.
" To be a relevant alternative, the area of relocation must be physically,
safely, and legally accessible to the claimant.
" An individual may not be denied refugee status merely because he
could have relocated to the IFA unless it would have been reasonable
to expect him to do so.
" A determination of the reasonableness of an IFA requires an
examination of all relevant criteria, including whether the individual
can enjoy fundamental civil, political, economic, social and cultural
rights as a citizen (or habitual residence for a stateless person) in the
area of relocation, including economic survival, without facing an
undue hardship.
" If the individual risks being persecuted, including any new form of
persecution, it is not reasonable to expect relocation.
3.3 The Convention Ground of Religion
It is beyond the parameters of this paper to provide a comprehensive
definition of 'religion or belief as those terms are understood pursuant to
international norms, or academic discourse.20 3 An earlier section of this
paper (Part 2.2.2) provided a brief overview of the meaning of 'religion or
belief which has been derived from the key international instruments. As
therein noted, the drafters of the ICCPR intended to include beliefs such
203 ProfessorJeremy T. Gunn's excellent article, 'The Complexity of Religion and The Definition
of "Religion" in International Law', 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. _7. 189 (2003), addresses the difficulty of
'defining' religion, and puts forth a conceptual context and theoretical approach to 'understanding
(rather than defining) religion'. I defer to his thorough treatment of the issue, which goes beyond the
definitions derived from international norms, which I discuss herein.
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as 'agnosticism, free thought, atheism and rationalism' under the rubric
of 'religion or belief'. The European Union's Proposal for a Council
Directive 2 04 reaffirms this approach and its applicability to defining religion
within the context of the Refugee Convention. The E.U. proposal:
... [MInstructs members States to interpret [religion] so as to include the holding
of theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs. Persecution on religious grounds may
occur where such interference targets a person who does not wish to profess any
religion, refuses to take up a particular religion or does not wish to comply with all
or part of the rites and customs relating to a religion.
20 5
As noted in the introduction (Part 1) there has been a growing number of
new religions and religious minorities, and the recognition of certain belief
systems as 'religions' has been a matter of controversy. Notwithstanding
this fact, within the State jurisprudence surveyed for this paper, there were
a relatively small number of cases in which the characterization of a belief
system was at issue; those cases generally involved new or 'non-
mainstream' religions. This section reviews the cases - all from Canada
and the U.K. - and demonstrates the various tribunals' approaches to
defining 'religion'.
Canada
Of all the State decisions reviewed, the one with the most extensive and
instructive analysis is Hui Qjng Yang.20 6 The applicant, a thirty-seven year
old woman, fled China out offear of persecution for her practice of Falun
Gong. She had testified that Falun Gong was 'essential for her to cope with
problems in her life' 20 7 and that she had been suicidal until she had
discovered the practice. In her personal statement submitted as part of
her application, she had written:
I recognised the true meaning of my life and got my spiritual encouragement by
practising Falun Gong. It enriched my cultural life and improved my health as
well. Since I started practising Falun Gong, I have changed a lot. The principles of
practicing is (sic) Truth - Compassion - Forbearance or Tolerance. Truth
means to tell the truth. Compassion means to do good deeds for people and to be
a kind person. Forbearance or tolerance means to endure the humiliation that
normal people can not endure. As a Falun Gong practitioner and as a Chinese
Citizen (sic), I believe the principle of treating people nicely. I obey the laws and
regulations. I try to do good deeds for people and I try to be useful to the country
and society and to be helpful to other people.
20 8
204 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Directive, n. 50 above.
205 Ibid. at 21, Art. 12(b).
206 Hui Qng Yang v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2001] FCT 1052, also available at
(http://www.canlii.org/ca/cas/fc/2OOJ/2OOfct1052.htm4.
207 Ibid. at 2.
208 Ibid. at 4-5.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Int'l J. Refugee L. 202 2004
Claims for Protection Based on Religion 203
The CRDD had rejected her claim, ruling, inter alia, that Falun Gong was
not a religion, and the case was appealed to the Federal Court. The court
began its analysis by recognizing that Canadian jurisprudence had not
defined 'religion' for purposes of its Immigration Act, but that guidance
was provided by international law norms and scholarly writing on the
issue. The court looked to the writings ofJames Hathaway, the UNHCR
Handbook, relevant treatises,20 9 and the Canadian Encyclopedia. After
canvassing this extensive authority, it concluded that the CRDD had
erred in denying that Falun Gong was a religion. Relevant, but not
dispositive, was the fact that the government of China considered Falun
Gong to be a religion.2 10
In Ademokoya v. Canada,2 1  the relative obscurity of a religion resulted in
an initial denial by the CRDD, which was reversed by the Federal Court.
The applicant, a devout Christian, feared persecution from the Ogboni
Lodge Fraternity. His fear arose from their threats and attacks following
his refusal to join them, as required so to do upon his father's death.2 12 In
denying, the CRDD had confused the Ogboni Lodge Fraternity (which
could be a source of persecution) with the Reformed Ogboni Fraternity
(ROF) which was not considered to be persecutory. 13
Bodoeva v. Canada,2 14 also involved a religion - the Ezid - which is non-
mainstream. As a consequence, there was no documentation regarding the
situation of persons practising the religion in the country of feared per-
secution, Georgia. Because of the lack of documentation, the Refugee
Division 'had to proceed by analogy and look at the treatment given to
other religions in Georgia' l 5 to determine the risk of persecution to the
applicants. The Federal Court upheld this approach as legitimate and
dismissed the appeal.2 16
209 The court quoted from Immigration Law and Practice by Lorne Waldeman, as follows:
In addition, the concept of religion should be broadly interpreted to allow for claims based on a
person's religious beliefs, even if those are not part of an organized religion. This can even be extended
to cover cases where a person's religious beliefs are such that he or she rejects religion altogether. If a
person is persecuted by reason of such a belief, then there will be a sufficient nexus to the claim. This
position was adopted by the Australian High Court in the case of Okere v. Minister for Immigration and
M'fulticultural Affairs, where the court accepted a claim based on religion where the person was not
persecuted because of his participating in a specific religion, but rather because of his refusal to do so.
Ibid. at 3.
210 The court ruled that '[i]f Falun Gong is considered by the Government of China to be a
reli.on, then it must be so for the purposes of the instant claim'. Ibid. at 5.
Ademokoya v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2001] FCT 1398; also available at
(http://decisions.fct-cf gc.ca).
212 Ibid. at para. 4.
213 Ibid. at para. 8.
214 Badoeva v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immgration) [2000] Docket: IMM-4925-99, available
at (http://decisionsfct-cf.gc.ca) (visited 12 June 2002).
215 Ibid. at para. 21.
216 Badoeva at para. 32.
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In Oloyede v. Canada,2 17 the Federal Court of Canada upheld the denial of
refugee status to the applicant who feared a 'vampire cult' in Nigeria.
Similar to the Ademokoya case, the asylum seeker, a devout Christian, feared
the group because of threats and attacks upon his refusal to join. The cult
had shot and killed his mother, burned down one of his father's businesses,
and blown up his car. 2 18 The denial was based on the finding that the
applicant 'had been subjected to cult criminal activity rather than religious
persecution ... '.219
United Kingdom
In IKinuthia v. Secretay of State,220 the U.K. Court of Appeal considered the
claim of a Kenyan woman who was an adherent to a traditional religion,
the Mungiki. She had been arrested and mistreated on a number of
occasions because of her religious membership. 22 1 In adjudicating herga P" 222 g
claims, the IAT had referred disparagingly to the Mungiki. Although
it was not the basis for allowing her appeal, the Court of Appeal [Pill J]
criticized the IAT for its approach:
I do not see the relevance to the present case of the tenets of the religion to which
the appellant wishes to adhere .... In considering whether there is persecution on
Convention grounds, it does not appear to me relevant in the present case to
consider the attitude of the adopted religion to other religions or what the
international community may think of it.223
It can be seen, therefore, that there are several difficulties arising with
respect to the Convention ground of religion. Where the belief or practice
is relatively new, the tribunal may face the difficult question of character-
izing it as a religion or not. If the belief is one that arouses hostility on the
part of the factfinder at some level (such as the Kinuthia decision), there is
the possible issue of bias. Finally, where the religion or belief is relatively
new or non-mainstream, there may be a dearth of information necessarily
to evaluate the well-foundedness of the fear. Thus:
In determining whether a belief or practice is a 'religion' as that
term is defined in international law, a factfinder is to be guided
by the relevant international authority which gives meaning to the
term.
217 Oloyede v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and lmmikration) [2001] FCT 255; also available at (http://
decisions.fct-cfgc.ca).
218 Ibid. at para. 3.
219 Ibid. at para. 8.
220 Kinuthia v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] EWCA Civ 2100; also available at
(htt:/ww.en.org.uk/index.htm) (visited 18July 2002).
t2/ Ibid. at para. 4.222 Ibid. at para. 8.
223 tknuthia at para. 9.
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* Relevant authority includes, but is not limited to: the UDHR, the
ICCPR, relevant General Comments issued by the U.N. Human
Rights Committee, the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms
of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, and
the body of reports by U.N. Special Rapporteurs.
* In determining whether a particular belief or practice is a 'religion' a
factfinder should also consider whether the agents of persecution
consider it to be a religion, because an individual can be persecuted
on the basis of imputed, as well as actual religious affiliation or
beliefs.
* In light of the cultural and sociological complexities which inhere in
defining a practice as a religion, or determining whether persecutors
consider it as such, a factfinder is encouraged to seek out the
assistance of professionals with relevant expertise on the issue.
3.4 For reasons of/Nexus
3.4.1 The Nature of the Required Causal Link
The refugee definition requires that the feared harm be 'for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion'. The phrase 'for reasons of connotes a nexus or causal
relationship between the feared harms and one of the five grounds. The
Convention is silent regarding the nature of the causal relationship.
Although the UNHCR Handbook addresses nexus generally at paragraphs
66 and 67,224 it does not elaborate on the nature of the causal relationship.
The issue of nexus, and how it is determined has become of increasing
importance - and controversy - in the adjudication of refugee claims,
and has become in some States the overwhelming basis for denial of claims
for protection.
Nexus is of tremendous significance in claims based on religion or belief.
Any nexus test which requires extensive and detailed proof of the relation-
ship between the feared persecution and the asylum seeker's religion poses
a potentially unsurmountable obstacle to protection. As noted in Part I
above, religious persecution is often the result of 'complex, multifaceted
and intertwined' factors, and occurs in socio-political contexts where it is
difficult to separate the bias towards religion from other political or ethnic
causes. Under these circumstances, imposing an overly rigorous or inflex-
ible test to establish nexus is likely to result in failed protection for the
victims of religious persecution. In addition, as discussed below, there are
some formulations of the nexus test - such as an intent-based formula-
tion - which are primafacie inadequate to protect the fundamental right to
freedom of religion or belief.
224 UNHCR, Handbook, n. 22 above, para.66-6 7 .
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3.4.2 hvergent Approaches to Interpreting 'For Reasons Of'
Because of the lack of interpretive guidance on causation in the Conven-
tion, its travaux prparatoires, and the UNHCR Handbook, tribunals have
often looked towards standards of causation existing in other jurispruden-
tial areas. They have adopted various approaches, 225 with some States
requiring proof of intent or motivation of the persecutor, others focusing
on the effect rather than the intent, and still others eshewing any specific
formula in favor of a flexible approach. U.S. jurisprudence has imposed
the most rigid formula, requiring proof of the persecutor's intent in order
to establish nexus. 226 Other States have adopted a 'but for' test derived
from torts law, while others have stressed the importance of a flexible
approach, suggesting that the context and nature of the claim should
inform the interpretation applied in any given case. For example, the
High Court of Australia has observed:
The meaning of any statutory notion of causation depends upon the precise
context in which the issue is presented. Providing that meaning will usually
involve the decisionmaker in introducing considerations of policy which cannot
be reduced to a strictly logical deduction from words. Thus in the field of torts law,
the matter cannot be expressed as a simple formula. The 'but for' test, which was
formerly much favoured by the common law, needs to be tempered by 'the
infusion of policy considerations'. In the context of the expression 'for reasons
of' in the Convention, it is neither practicable nor desirable to attempt to formulate 'rules' or
'principles' which can be substituted for the Convention language.227
In a trio of recent cases involving not religion, but gender asylum claims,228 229--• 230 -
-
the U.K., New Zealand and Australia ruled that it was not
225 For a detailed discussion of the various tests, see Michelle Foster, 'Causation in Context:
Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention', (2002) 23 M4ich. J. Int'l L. 265.
226 L)/S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992).
227 Chen Shi Hai (an infant) by his next fiend Chen Ren Bing. v. Minister for Immigration and
Mlulticultural Affairs [2000] HCA 19 at para. 68, available at (http://www.austlii.edu.au) (emphasis
added).
228 Islam (A.P.) v. Secretagy of Statefor the Home Department, Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another
Ex Pane Shah (A.P.) (Conjoined Appeals) r1999] (2 AC 629), available at (http.www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk) (finding that the appellants had established causation 'irrespective whether a
"but for" test, or an effective cause test, is adopted. In these circumstances the legal issue regarding the
test of causation ... need not be decided')[Lord Steyn].
229 RefugeeAppealNo. 71427/99 (2000) at para. 115, available at (http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/
default.asp) (visited 26July 2002) ('We do not in this decision have to decide what, in the refugee law
context, is the appropriate causation test, an issue also left open by Lord Steyn in Shah ... [above n.
202] In that case Lord Hoffmann at 654E (with whom Lord Hope at 655H agreed) rejected as an
oversimplification the proposition that the requirement of causation could be satisfied by applying the
"but for" test'.)
230 Ministerfor Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar [2002] HCA 14 at para. 84, available at
(http://www.austlii.edu.au) (not identifying a particular test for causation, but simply stating that 'malign
intention' on the part of the persecutors is not required, but that 'it must be possible to say in a given
case that the reason for the persecution is to be found in the singling out of one or more of the five
attributes expressed in the Convention definition[.]')
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even necessary to fully identify the particular causation test in order to
adjudicate the cases at issue. What is perhaps an even more significant
aspect of these decisions is their adoption of a more contextualized
approach to nexus determination. These three cases involved non-state
agents of persecution, and each of the tribunals held that where
the non-state actor does not persecute for a Convention reason,
nexus may still be established if the State's failure to protect is linked
to a Convention ground. In explaining the logic of this 'bifurcated'
approach, the House of Lords invoked religious persecution during the
Holocaust:
[S] uppose that the Nazi government in those early days did not actively organise
violence against Jews, but pursued a policy of not giving any protection to Jews
subjected to violence by neighbours. A Jewish shopkeeper is attacked by a gang
organised by an Aryan competitor who smash his shop, beat him up and threaten
to do it again if he remains in business. The competitor and his gang are
motivated by business rivalry and a desire to settle old personal scores, but they
would not have done what they did unless they knew that the authorities would
allow them to act with impunity.
23 1
UNHCR has expressly adopted this bifurcated approach in its recently
released guidelines on social group 232 and gender claims. 233 This
approach is important for religion-based claims, which frequently involve
non-state agents of persecution.
3.4.3 State Jurisprudence on Causation in Religion-based Claims
Claims based on religion or belief encompass a broad range of factual
scenarios, raising distinct and different issues of causation. This section
groups the cases into categories representative of commonly occurring
claims and provides an overview of significant interpretive issues related
to nexus.
3.4.3.1 Conscientious Objection to Militay Service
A number of religions have abstention from military service as a central
tenet, and numerous religion-based claims for protection arise from a
refusal to serve in the military. Claims based on refusal to serve are closely
related to issues of prosecution/persecution. Prosecution and punishment
231 Islam (A.P.) v. Secretary of Statefor the Home Department, Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tibunal andAnother
Ex Parte Shah (A.P.) (Conjoined Appeals), above n. 202.232 See UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Membership in a Particular Social
Grot :p UN doc. HCR/GIP/02/01, 7 May 2002, para. 19.
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution within the
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees: UN doc. HCR/GIP/02/01, 7 May 2002 [hereinafter UNHCR 2002 Gender Guidelines].
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pursuant to a law of general application is generally not considered to
constitute persecution. 34 However, there are exceptions, including situa-
tions where the law has a discriminatory intent or effect, where it impro-
perly interferes with the exercise of protected rights, or where the
punishment for its violation is not proportional to the societal objective
of the law.
235
Consistent with these principles is the rule that sovereign nations have
the right to conscript their citizenry to raise an army, and generally the
prosecution and punishment of draft evaders and resisters does not con-
stitute persecution. There are, however, exceptions recommended in the
UNHCR Handbook when: 1) the punishment for desertion or draft evasion
is disproportionate for a Convention reason; 236 or 2) the refusal to serve is
based on genuine political, religious, or moral convictions, or valid reasons
of conscience. 237 A refusal to serve for political convictions must meet the
additional criteria of demonstrating that the type of military action to
which the individual objects 'is condemned by the international commu-
nity as contrary to basic rules of human conduct ... ,.238 The rationale
underlying the general rule that prosecution and punishment of conscien-
tious objectors can constitute persecution is that to punish an individual
for adhering to religion or belief is tantamount to persecuting him for
these beliefs.
United States
Owing to the nexus 'proof of intent' requirement in the U.S., claims
for refugee status based on conscientious objection - especially reli-
giously-motivated conscientious objection - have not fared well. Courts
have consistently ruled that the government's intent was to raise an
army, not to persecute the applicant for his or her religion or belief,
and that therefore nexus could not be established. The landmark case
on this issue is Cafias-Segovia v. LMS, 239 ruling that it is not religious
234 The UNHCR Handbook, para. 56-60, addresses exceptions to the rule that prosecution is not
persecution. UNHCR, Handbook, n. 22 above, para. 56-60.
235 See, for example, Goodwin-Gill, n.3 above, 52-3 (footnote omitted):
Every government has the right to enact, implement and enforce its own legislation, inherent in its
sovereignty and in the principle of the reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the
presumption of legitimacy in the legislative field, the discriminatory application oflaw or the use of law
to promote discrimination may tend to persecution. In this sense, a human rights perspective can
inform the approach to persecution, for example, by indicating which rights are absolute, which may
be 'subject to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and reasonably necessary in a democratic
society', whether restrictions are reasonably necessary, and whether any prohibition or penalty is
proportional to the (social) objective that the legislation aims to achieve.
236 UNHCR, Handbook, n. 22 above, para. 169.
237 Ibid., para. 170.
238 Ibid, para. 171.
239 INSv. Cafias-Segovia, 970 F.2d 599 (91h Cir. 1992)
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In contrast to the U.S., Canada interprets 'for reasons of' in a manner
which recognizes conscientious objectors as refugees. It does this by
adopting a nexus analysis which looks to either the intent or the effects of
the law requiring military service. The principal case setting forth this
approach is Zoyfagharkhani v. Canada24 2 involving an Iranian who did not
want to serve in the military of his country after he learned that the
government intended to use chcmical warfare against the Kurds. 243 The
Court ruled that 'the ... definition of Convention refugee makes the
intent (or any principal effect) of an ordinary law of general applica-
tion ... relevant to the existence of persecution'. 244 Canadian tribunals
have consistently applied an interpretation contemplating protection in
cases involving objections to military service based on religion or belief.245
240 The official position of theJehovah's Witnesses regarding military service is as follows:
Jehovah's Witnesses are conscientiously opposed to war and to their participation in such in any form
whatsoever. For this reason they inform officials of the government that they conscientiously object to
serving in the military, in any substitute service therefor or in any civilian capacity which fosters or
supports the military ....
The National Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors, Words of Conscience, Religious
Statements on Conscientious Objection 115 (10 h Ed. 1983), quoted in Karen Musalo, 'Swords into Plough-
shares: Why The United States Should Provide Refuge to Young Men who Refuse to Bear Arms for
Reasons of Conscience', (1989) 26 San Diego L. Rev. 849, 866 n. 88.
241 This ruling was contrary to the position urged by the UNHCR in a brief amicus curiae in Cailas.
Goodwin-Gill, Timberlake & Steinhardt, n. 24 above. There are two Ninth Circuit decisions; Caias-
Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9' Cir. 1990) (Caslas I) and Cahas-Segovia v. LAS, 970 F.2d 599 (9"h Cir.
1992) (Cahas II). In Cafias I, decided before the U.S. Supreme Court imposed an intent requirement,
the Ninth Circuit found that to punish a conscientious objector for adherence to his religious beliefs
had the effect of persecuting him for his religion, and therefore is persecution 'on account of religion'.
After the Supreme Court adopted an intent requirement, it vacated Cahas 1, and remanded it to the
Ninth Circuit. (112 S.Ct. 1152) In light of the intent requirement, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that it could no longer find persecution on account of religion. On the facts of the case, however,
the court granted on the alternative theory of imputed political opinion because the evidence
established that young Salvadoran men who refused to serve in the military were suspected of being
affiliated with the anti-government guerrillas, and were targeted for disappearance and extrajudicial
execution.
For an extended discussion of the two Calas decisions and the distinctions between an intent and effects
test in U.S. First Amendment, as well as U.S. asylum law, see Karen Musalo, 'Irreconcilable
Differences', n. 25 above, at 1213-40.
242 Zolfagharkhani v. Canada (Minister of Emplyment and immiration) (C.A.) [1993] 3 F.C. 540, also
available at (http://www.canlii.org).
243 Ibid. at 1-2.244 Ibid. at 8.
245 See, for example, Rostanzadeh-Jahan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Imrmiration) [1993]
38 A.C.W.S. (3d) 571, also available at 1993 A.C.W.SJ. LEXIS 44101 (setting aside decision of
Immigration and Refugee Board denying relief where Iranian testified he left the military before
fulfilling his service because the Koran and Mohammed directs one not to kill one's Muslim
brothers); Ciric v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immiration) [1993] 71 F.T.R. 300 (setting aside
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New Zealand
In New Zealand, the RSAA's approach is similar to that of the U.S. It
has generally cited the fact that military service is imposed by way of a
law of universal application, and therefore neither the service itself nor
punishment for refusal is linked to a Convention reason. 246 There
appears to be one case which is an exception to this general trend,
involving a Baptist from the Ukraine who refused military service as
contrary to his religious beliefs.2" 7 The RSAA has limited this positive
ruling to its facts, and distinguished it from successive cases that have
come before it.2 4 8 It has denied claims of a Russian citizen with
religious and moral objections to serving in Chechnya; 24 9 a national
of Ukraine and the Russian Federation with religious objections to




In a recent decision, Sepet and Bulbul,252 the House of Lords denied the
claims of two Kurds who objected to military service in Turkey. The two
men were not opposed to all military service, but did not want to fight in
Turkey's military because they believed they would be compelled to fight
against fellow Kurds and engage in acts contrary to international norms -
an allegation which the Lords rejected. 253 Unlike the tribunals of the
United States, which focus on the issue of intent or motivation, the
decision of Board where Serbs did not want to serve in ongoing military action in Yugoslavia in
the early 1990s).246 The RSAA does recognize that a viable claim may be based on Handbook paragraphs
169 (disproportionate punishment) or 171 (military action in contravention of human rights
norms).
247 Refugee Appeal No. 1789/93 (1995) cited in RefugeeAppeal No. 71219/99 (1999) at 14, available at
( h ttp:- // wwwi. refugee. o rg. nz ) .
248 The Ukrainian Baptist decision included language that 'the law relating to that alternative
service appears to be being selectively and restrictively applied, and it is not at all clear that the
appellant would be eligible for such service'. RefugeeAppealo.A. 1789/93 at 5-6. The RSAA relied upon
this line in the decision to conclude that the recognition of refugee status was due to disproportionate or
discriminatory enforcement of the universal conscription law and that the case was not a basis for a
broad recognition of claims based on conscientious objection. See Refugee Appeal No. 71219/99 (1999) at
14 available at (http://www.refugee.org.nz).
2 Refigee Appeal.Ao. 2155/94 (1997) cited in Refugee Appeal No. 71219/99 (1999) at 8, available at
(http://www.refugee.org.nz).
250 Refugee Appeal.No. 70625/97 (1998) cited in Refugee AppealNo. 71219/99 (1999) at 10, available at
(http://www.refugee.org.nz).
251 Refugee AppealNo. 71219/99 (1999); Refugee Appeal.Ao. 71055/98 (1998) cited in Refugee AppealAo.
71219/99 (1999) at 10, available at (http://www.refugee.org.nz).
252 Sepet (F.C.) and Another (F.C.) v. Secretay of Stae for the Home Department [2003] 3 ALL ER 304
(House of Lords), available at House of Lords decisions delivered since 14 Nov. 1996 htlp://
wwwpublications.parliatnent.uk/pa/ld199697/jugmt/ldjudgnt.htm (visited 18 Mar. 2004).
25s Ibid. at paras. 3, 8, 26.
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Lords focused for the most part on whether there is a fundamental right to
conscientious objection (Lord Hoffman) or to non-combatant military
service (Lord Bingham). Although the Lords found a growing recognition
of these rights in international law, they did not find they had attained the
status of international rights.
254
In focusing on the status of conscientious objection within the framework
of internationally recognized human rights in determining entitlement to
Convention protection, the Lords adopt a laudable approach - namely
that international norms on freedom of religion and belief ought to inform
the adjudication of religion-based claims. Returning to the particular norm
at issue in Sepet and Bulbul- conscientious objection as a legitimate exercise
of freedom of religion or belief- the House of Lords decision itself reflects
the growing recognition of such a right.
25 5
That factor, considered in conjunction with the UNHCR's long-stand-
ing position on the issue, as manifested by the Handbook as well as its
intervention before State tribunals as amicus curiae, support the adoption
of an analytical approach in determining nexus which does not preclude
protection in conscientious objection cases. An appropriate approach
would employ a flexible nexus determination which is not limited by an
intent-based analysis; this position is articulated in UNHCR's brief amicus
curiae in Sepet andBulbul, and was the approach applied by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Canas .256
3.4.3.2 Claims Precluded by an Intents-based Analysis
As demonstrated by the analysis in conscientious objection cases in the
U.S. and New Zealand, an intent-based analysis may fail to protect
individuals who are severely impacted as a result of adherence to
their religious beliefs. The failure of protection which results from an
254 (Lord Bingham observed that '[w]hile, therefore, there are indications of changed thin-
king ... there is as yet no authority to support the applicants' contention', and '[I dismiss] with a
measure of reluctance since [applicants' argument] may well reflect the international consensus of
tomorrow'.) Ibid. at paras. 17, 20.
255 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill writes that '[t]he international community... appears to be moving
towards acceptance of a right of conscientious objection, particularly as a result of the standard-setting
activities of United Nations and regional bodies'. Goodwin-Gill, n. 3 above, 55-56. Goodwin-Gill
references the numerous United Nations and European Union measures addressing conscientious
objection. Ibid., at 56, n. 94.
256 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied U.S. constitutional norms on free exercise of
religion in Caas I. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees free exercise of religion
and had long applied an 'effects' rather than an 'intents' test evaluating whether there had been
impermissible interference with free exercise. In Cafias I the Ninth Circuit held that even though the
conscription statute was neutral, its impact/effect on Jehovah's Witnesses was to persecute them for
their religion because it required them to participate in military actions in contravention of their
religious beliefs. 902 F.2d 717 (9 1h Cir. 1990).
Although the U.S. Supreme Court essentially rejected its First Amendment effects test in its decision
Employment Dimion v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the fact remains that an effects test is much more
effective at protecting religious freedom than an intents test.
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intent-based analysis is not limited to conscientious objection cases. The
U.K. decision, Omoruyi v. Secretay of State257 is demonstrative of the failure
of protection which may result in other contexts involving an individual's
desire to adhere to deeply held beliefs.
The applicant in Omoruyi was a Christian in Nigeria who resisted the
demands of the Ogboni secret cult to join them and to surrender his
father's body upon the latter's death. His refusal to do both arose from
his Christian beliefs.25 8 As a result of his refusal, the Ogboni murdered and
mutilated his brother (whom they mistook for him) and killed his three year
old son. The applicant's attorney had argued that the reason he was at risk
was because of 'religious differences between [himsel] and the Ogboni:
the cult's rites demanded that he surrender his father's body for ritual
mutilation and burial; his Christian beliefs prevented him from doing
so'.
2 5 9 In key language which demonstrates the limits of an intent-
approach, the Court denied protection, observing that the Ogboni had
no intent to harm him for his religion, but simply to punish him because he
refused to comply with their demands.
260
3.4.3.3 Gender Cases Involving Repressive Social Norms
Gender asylum cases involving repressive social norms constitute
another category of claims which raise issues of prosecution/persecution
See, for example, Jason W. Rockwell, 'When Congress Answers Religion's Prayer: The Religious
Liberty Protection Act of 1999' (2001) 25 Seton Hall Legis. J. 135, 136 noting that: 'inn Employment
Division v Smith, the Court held that neutral, generally applicable laws that burden religious exercise
without specifically targeting religious practice do not violate the First Amendment. Congress strongly
criticized that ruling as inadequate protection of religious freedom... ', footnotes omitted).
Congress twice enacted legislation intended to limit Smith, and to restore an effects test. Its first attempt,
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court as unconstitu-
tional. Rockwell at 136-7. Its second attempt, which has a more modest reach (as indicated by its title)
is the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L.No. 106-274, 114 Stat.
803 (2000).
257 Omoruyi v. Secretay of State for the Home Department [2001] Imm AR 175 (CA); also available at
(http://www.refugeecaselaw.org/Refgee/Default.asp).
258 Ibid. at 1-2.
259 Ibid. at 3.
260 Omoruyi at 8. This language is virtually identical to the language in Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992),
the key U.S. decision establishing the intent requirement. In Zacarias the Court held that the persecu-
tion feared by the young Guatemalan who did not want to fight with the guerrillas would not be to
punish him for his political opinion, but for his refusal to comply with the demand that he fight with
them. Zacarias at 483.
261 Some commentators also categorize cases involving female genital mutilation (FGM) as being
religion-based. However there is a substantial body of literature which refutes that the practice of FGM
is rooted in religion. See, e.g., Alexi Nicole Wood, 'A Cultural Rite of Passage or a Form of Torture:
Female Genital Mutilation From an International Law Perspective', 12 Hast. Women's LJ. 347, 356
(Summer 1002) ('Religion is one of the most commonly cited justifications for FGM. The procedure
has been performed by Christians, Jews, Muslims, animists and atheists, but is most commonly
performed in Muslim nations. However, there is evidence of the practice of FGM dating back as far
as the fifth century B.C., thereby predating both Islam and Christianity. The practice does not exist in
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as well as causation/nexus. The status of women in many societies26 2 may
be 'restricted and dictated by legal, social or religious mores'. 263 A broad
range of penalties may be imposed for failure to comply with these norms,
from flogging to stoning to death.26 4
There is an increasing trend to analyze such gender claims under the
rubric of social group. 265However, as the May 2002 UNHCR Guidelines
on Gender-Related Persecution state, when the norms derive from reli-
gion,266 such claims may also be analyzed as religion based claims.2 6 7 A
woman's resistance to conforming her behavior 'may be perceived as
evidence that [she] holds unacceptable religious opinions regardless of
what she actually believes'. 26 8 In cases where the religion is an official or
State religion, the claim may also be analyzed in terms of political opinion,
in that the failure to conform 'could be interpreted as holding an unac-
ceptable political opinion that threatens the basic structure from which
certain political power flows'.
2 6 9
The UNHCR Guidelines of 2002 affirm the approach already adopted
by a number of State tribunals on this issue. For example, in Namitabar v.
Canada,27 0 the Federal Court of Canada ruled that because Iran is a
theocracy, the failure to observe the clothing code 'could be regarded as
a political act giving rise to a valid fear of persecution'. 27 1 The Namitabar
the teachings of any formal religion'.); Christopher T. Paresi, 'Symbolic Rites: Examining the
Adequacy of Federal Legislation Addressing the Problem of Female Excision in the United States', 8
Buff. Hum. Ris L Rev. 163, 171 (2002) ('Dorenkenoo discusses the controversial belief that FE [female
excision] is rooted in certain religions, more specifically how FE correlates to the religion of Islam.
While it is argued that there is no mention of FE in the Koran, it is also disputed that the practice is
deeply rooted in Sunna,or the words and actions of the Islamic Prophet Mohammed'.).
262 Numerous reports of the Special Rapporteur describe how women are among the most affected
victims of religious extremism. See, for example, A/53/279, n.5 above, para 91; A/54/386, n.5 above,
para. 129(b), 134-139; E/CN.4/2000/65, n. 7 above, para. 173; E/CN.4/2001/63, n.7 above,
para. 86.
263 Heaven Crawley, Refugees and Gender: Law and Process, (Bristol:Jordan Publishing Limited, 2001),
113.
264 Ibid.
265 This social group analysis was first recommended in ExCom Conclusion No. 39, Refugee
Women and International Protection (1985) para. (k):
Recognized that States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, are free to adopt the interpretation that
women asylum-seekers who face harsh or inhuman treatment due to their having transgressed the
social mores of the society in which they live may be considered as a 'particular social group' within the
meaning of Article I A(2) of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention.
UNHCR, 'Refugee Women and International Protection', Executive Committee Conclusion No. 39
PXXVI) 1985, para. (k).
266In her seminal article, 'Orientalism Revisited in Asylum and Refugee Claims', 12/JRL 7 (2000),
Susan Akram makes a persuasive argument that the repressive norms do not derive from the dictates of
Islam, but are related to the issues of male domination, male power structure and religious orthodoxy.
267 UNHCR 2002 Gender Guidelines, n. 233 above, para. 25.
268 Ibid.
269 UNHCR 2002 Gender Guidelines, n. 233 above, para. 26.
270 .amitabar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and lmmiration) [1993] 2 F.C. 42; also available at
(http://www.westlaw.com).
271 Ibid. at 2.
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decision directly addresses the prosecution/persecution dichotomy,
rejecting the analysis that punishment under Iran's laws was merely
prosecution. The Federal Court of Canada ruled that the law requiring
wearing of the chador was not of general application because it applied
only to women, and that the penalty (74 strokes of the whip) was dispro-
portionate and inflicted without procedural guarantees.
272
The New Zealand tribunals have followed a similar analysis. In Refugee
Appeal Number 2039/93, the RSAA ruled positively on the claim of an
Iranian woman who opposed 'the patriarchal society comprising her
extended Arab family and ... the male domination of women in Iranian
society at large ... '.7 The RSAA ruled that her well-founded fear of
persecution was on account of religion and political opinion, given the fact
that Iran is a theocracy. 274 It ruled that way again in Refugee Appeal Number
2223/94,275 another claim for asylum based on resistance to the Iranian
government's restrictive gender-specific dress codes.
The federal courts in the United States have issued three significant
decisions involving claims based on repressive social norms. However,
only one of the three, Fisher v. LS 2 76 was premised on a claim of religion,
rather than social group, 2 77 and that decision once again underscores the
limits of an intent-based analysis.
The claim of Saideh Fisher, an Iranian woman, was considered twice by
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In its first decision ('Fisher 1,)278 the
court ruled that if one of the reasons for the government's enforcement of
generally applicable laws regarding dress codes was to 'oppress those with
minority religious views' persecution on account of religion could be
proven. 2 79 The INS disagreed with the court's decision and asked a larger
panel of the court ('en banc') to re-decide the case. 280 The en banc panel
vacated Fisher I and ruled that forced compliance or punishment for refusal
to comply with the repressive norms did not constitute persecution, 28 1 and
any action taken by the government would not be on account of religion or
political opinion because no intent had been proven to persecute for those
272 Ibid.
273 Relugee AppealNo. 2039/93 (1996) at 21, available at (http://www.refugee.org.nz).
274 Ibid. at 21, 27.
275 Refugee Appeal No. 2223/94 (1996), available at (http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz).
276 Fisherl: Fisherv. I.NS. 37 F.3d 1371 (9" Cir. 1994); Fishery Fishery. LIS. 79 F.3d 955 (91h Cir.
1996).
277 The two social group cases are Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233 (3rd Cir. 1993), and Safaie v. INS, 25
F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994). In both cases the court accepted that forced compliance with the Iranian
norms could constitute persecution if such compliance was 'abhorrent' to the individual's belief. The
court ruled that because the women were willing to comply rather than be punished, the compliance
was not so distasteful, i.e., 'abhorrent' to constitute persecution, and on that basis denied relief.
278 Fishery. I.N.S. 37 F.3d 1371 (9th Cir. 1994). [Fisher279 Fisher I at 1383.
280 Fisher v. LN/S. 79 F.3d 955 (9"h Cir. 1996). [Fisher II]281 Fisher II at 962.
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reasons. 282 Writing for the full court,Justice Wallace went so far as to state
that: 'The mere existence of a law permitting the detention, arrest, or even
imprisonment of a woman who does not wear the chador in Iran does not
constitute persecution any more than it would if the same law existed in the
United States'.
283
3.4.3.4 Claims Related to Inter-religious Relationships
In situations where there is religious intolerance and discrimination
against a disfavored group, individuals who do not accept the lines
drawn by those harboring bias are often targeted. For this reason, indivi-
duals who have crossed the line to enter into inter-religious relationships
and marriages are frequently at risk of persecution. Because the persecu-
tion is directed at individuals to punish them for entering into or main-
taining a relationship, some adjudicators have initially analyzed such cases
as having to do with 'personal' or 'private' matters outside the protection
of the Refugee Convention. Where there is a prohibition in law regarding
some aspect of the relationship, adjudicators have also analyzed such
claims as involving prosecution not persecution. In two decisions, one
each from the U.S. and Canada, the tribunals have reversed/quashed
decisions finding inter-religious claims to be outside of the Convention's
protection, and found the cases to come within the rubric of religion-based
persecution. Bandari v. LS 284 involved the claim of a young man in Iran
who was arrested after he was seen embracing a Muslim woman he had
been secretly dating, in violation of a law against public displays of affec-
tion. Once it was discovered that he was an Armenian Christian, he was
severely beaten, pressured in an attempt to coerce him to state that he had
raped his girlfriend, and then brought in front of a judge who informed
him that he had violated the prohibition on 'interfaith relationships'.
285
The judge told him he could convert to Islam or submit to punishment,
which would be stoning to death if he were an adult but would 'only' be 75• • •286
lashes and a year in prison because of his youth. Bandari's grandfather
managed to secure his release by payment of a bribe. He fled Iran after he
had an additional incident when he encountered police officers who
recognized him, and beat him while hurling ethnic and religious
epithets.2 87 On these facts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the BIA's finding that Bandari had been prosecuted for violating a neutral




284 Bandari v. LI.S., 227 F.3d 1160 (91h Cir. 2000).
285 Bandari, ibid. at 1163.
286 Ibid. at 1163-64.
287 Ibid. at 1164.
288 Ibid. at 1169.
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In Chabira v. Canada,289 the applicant, an atheist Berber from Algeria,
was involved with a Muslim woman, who became pregnant. His request to
marry her was refused because of his background. When her family
learned of the pregnancy, they physically attacked the applicant and his
family, said he deserved the death penalty and posted his photo on the
walls of mosques 'inviting vengeance'. 290 The Federal Court of Canada set
aside the Refugee Division's finding that it was merely a private conflict; in
relevant part the Court observed:
... [I] t is true... that at the outset this was purely a private conflict between the
families of two young lovers of different religions and political allegiances. How-
ever, it appears from the evidence that the problem took on considerably greater
scope and a religious tint because of, first, certain matters in the applicant's family
history, and second, the posting of the applicant's photo in the mosques, inviting
vengeance, in accordance with the religious beliefs of the young woman's
family...
[The Refugee Division] ... erred in concluding that the ground asserted by the
claimant was not a ground recognized by the Convention .... The applicant, who
was an atheist and non-observer, did not, it seems, respect the religious and moral
customs of his girlfriend's family, and accordingly was subjected to the wrath of
the entire community to which that family belonged. There is at the very least a
religious connotation to this.
29 1
3.4.3.5 Claims Arising During Civil War and Unrest
Many claims for refugee protection arise in the context of civil war or public
unrest. The fact that they occur during such situations does not preclude
the establishment of nexus to a Convention ground. A decision of the
RSAA in New Zealand, Refugee Appeal Number 71271/99, provides an
appropriate analysis for such cases, ruling that the origins and purposes of
the conflict must be examined. In that case, the applicant was a black
Christian from the south of Sudan. The RSAA found that because the
Sudanese civil war 'is grounded primarily in issues of race and religion:
simplistically put, between the fair Muslims from the north against the
black Christians and animists of the south',29 2 the applicant had established
a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of both his race and religion.
3.4.3.6 Overlapping Convention Reasons/Non-Convention Reasons
As reiterated a number of times, religious persecution is rarely just about
religion. Among other things, it has to do with issues of race, nationality,
ethnicity, political opinion and gender. It implicates political and
289 Chabira v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immiration) [1994] 27 Infm. L.R. (2d) 75, also
available at (http://www.westlaw.com).
290 Chabira, at 2, 4.
291 Ibid., at 4.
292 Refigee Appeal No. 71271/99(1999), at 15.
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economic power, and may have its origins in historical precedents. In this
context, it is easy to understand that claims of religion-based persecution
often overlap with one or more of the other Convention reasons - or may
overlap with non-Convention reasons. Where the cases discussed in this
paper involved other Convention grounds, mention was made of that fact.
However, within the jurisprudence of the four countries surveyed, the
cases in which religion overlapped with one or more of the other Conven-
tion grounds are too numerous to include, and too distinct to make any
generalizations. However, the conclusion which it is important to reach on
this issue is that religion claims are rarely just about religion and that fact
should not prejudice them from being recognized as religion-based cases
where the facts support such a determination.
In a significant number of cases in which individuals face grave and
serious persecution for reasons related to their religion, protection is
precluded because of the failure to meet the controlling nexus require-
ments in the various States. Standards for establishing nexus which pre-
clude the protection of genuine victims of religious persecution are not
consistent with the broad humanitarian objectives of the Refugee Con-
vention, nor consonant with the privileged position given to freedom of
religion or belief as a non-derogable right.
Nexus determinations should not be formalistic and inflexible, but
should take into consideration the nature and context of the particular
claim. U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence (prior to the Smith decision), as
well as recent U.S. congressional enactments, recognize that an intent test
is inadequate to protect religious freedom. For these same reasons an
intent test is also inadequate to protect victims of religious persecution.
Nexus should look to both the intent and effect of the persecutor's actions.
In addition, in cases involving non-state actors, adjudicators should
incorporate the bifurcated analysis adopted by a number of states and
recommended by the UNHCR in its recent social group and gender
guidelines. The bifurcated analysis would permit nexus to be established
in relation to the non-state actor, as well as the State. Therefore,
" International norms on freedom of religion or belief do not consider
'intent' to be a relevant factor in determining whether the protected
right has been violated.
" U.S. constitutional law principles prior to Smith, as well as recent
congressional enactments recognize that there can be impermissible
interference with free exercise of religion, even absent intent.
" An intent-based test for establishing nexus has proved to be
inadequate in extending protection to claimants who risk serious
violation of freedom of religion or belief.
" The requisite causal link may be established by a showing of either
intent or effects, so that an individual who has: (1) a well-founded fear
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of (2) suffering a sufficiendy serious violation of the right to freedom
or belief to constitute persecution (3) shall be presumed to have
established nexus if the persecutor intended to harm the applicant for
her religion, or absent intent, the effect of the persecutor's acts are to
harm the applicant for her religion.
" In claims involving non-state actors, nexus can be established in
relationship to the non-state actor, or the State.
" The causal link to religion may be satisfied: (1) where there is a real
risk of being persecuted by a non-state actor for reasons of religion,
whether or not the failure of the State to protect is related to religion;
or (2) where the risk of being persecuted by a non-state actor is
unrelated to religion, but the inability or unwillingness of the State to
offer protection is for reasons of religion.
3.5 Credibility
Religion based claims raise unique credibility issues. Adjudicators are
often suspicious that applicants may opportunistically claim to be adher-
ents of a persecuted religious group in order to avoid removal. Although
this concern is present in all religion-based cases, it is especially acute in
cases in which the applicant alleges a post-departure, or surplace, conver-
sion to a religion which is the target of persecution in his home country.
Adjudicators have adopted various approaches in their attempts to
evaluate the truthfulness of the claim, and the sincerity of the belief. A
favored approach is to test the applicant on knowledge of his or her
religion. Also in favor is an attempted assessment as to whether
the applicant's acts are consistent with the claimed religious belief or
affiliation.
As the cases discussed in this section demonstrate, there are limitations
to these approaches. First, in some circumstances, the depth of the appli-
cant's convictions may be irrelevant. This would be the case where,
irrespective of the applicant's own beliefs, the persecutor will view him
as an adherent of the disfavored faith. Second, knowledge of a particular
faith does not necessarily correlate to sincerity of conviction. This is
especially true where the test of knowledge is being conducted cross-
culturally. Finally, judging an applicant's knowledge or consistency of
actions with beliefs runs the risk of being subject to error as the adjudicator
may not have an adequate understanding of the religion to be able to make
these type of assessments.
3.5.1 Depth of the Applicant's Convictions/Imputed Religious Belief
In the U.S. several decisions have ruled that the appropriate test is not
whether the adjudicator believes the applicant to be a true believer, but
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whether the persecuting agents will so perceive him. Bastanipour v. LNS
2 93
involved the claim of an Iranian who alleged that he left his Muslim faith
for Christianity, thus committing apostasy and risking death upon return
to his country.2 94 The Board raised doubts about his conversion because
he had never been baptised, and while he was in prison for narcotics
charges, he had requested a pork-free diet required by his Muslim
faith. 9 5 The Seventh Circuit ruled that the Board's concerns about
the sincerity of his beliefs were misplaced because '[w]hether Bastani-
pour believes the tenets of Christianity in his heart of hearts or, as hinted
but not found by the Board, is acting opportunistically (though at great
risk to himsel) in the hope of staving off deportation would not, we
imagine, matter to an Iranian religious judge'. 296 Once Bastanipour had
identified himself as a Christian, he was at risk regardless of the depth of
his beliefs.
This same rule was reiterated in Najafi v. /NS,29 7 also involving an
Iranian who had converted from Islam to Christianity:
In an asylum case involving a country which punishes the abandonment of
religious belief, our task is theoretically easier. We must ask ourselves what
would count as conversion in the eyes of the Iranian Religious Judge. [citing to
Bastanipour]. Accordingly, we are not as concerned with the heart of the convert,
but rather require some bonafide indicia of apostasy which would matter to the
Iranian authorities.
298
In New Zealand, a 1994 decision of the RSAA adopted a 'good faith'
requirement to claims such as these which arise in the surplace context.
29 9
An applicant who 'cynically' engages in activities in the host country with
the objective of putting himself at risk so as to create a claim for asylum
may be denied. The applicant initially claimed to have been arrested in
Iran for possession of The Satanic Verses. After lodging his claim in New
Zealand, he there sought out television and print exposure regarding his
claim of persecution. 30 0 He subsequently admitted that his claim was
untrue, but then argued that he was at risk because the Iranian authorities
knew he had applied for political asylum and that he claimed to have been
in possession of The Satanic Verses. 30 1 After reviewing the position of
scholars and the comparative jurisprudence, 30 2 the RSAA concluded that
293 Bastanipour v. IX.S., 980 F.2d 1129 (7"' Cir. 1992).
294 Ibid. at 1131.
295 Ibid. at 1132.
296 Ba.stanipour at 1132.
297 Najafi v. 12.S., 104 F.3d 943 (7 th Cir. 1997).
298 Ibid. at 949.
299 Refugee Appeal No. 2254/94 (1994), available at (http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.gout.nz).
300 Ibid. at 3.
302 Refugee Appeal No. 2254/94, at 5.
302 The jurisprudence reviewed included that of Germany, Switzerland, France, the U.K., the U.S.
(including Bastanipour) Canada, and Australia.
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the integrity of the system 303 required a rule which generally required
good faith on the part of the applicant. The RSAA cautioned that the rule
was to be 'applied with caution, not zeal' and would often involve an
assessment which balanced the 'degree of bad faith, the nature of the harm
feared and the degree of risk'.
3.5.2 Knowledge of Religion and Acts Consistent with Religion
Although the tribunals of all four countries attempt to evaluate the cred-
ibility of religion-based claims by assessing the applicant's knowledge of
religion and consistency of actions with the religion, the tribunals acknowl-
edge the fallibility of such approaches. In the United States, the difficulty of
assessing faith was remarked upon by the court in Najafi where it observed
that: '[d]etermination of a religious faith by a tribunal is fraught with
complexity as true belief is not readily justiciable'. 30 5 judicial unease with
attempting to evaluate faith - especially in a cross-cultural context - was
remarked upon by a Ninth Circuit judge in his dissent to an opinion
finding a Nicaraguan applicant not credible in his claims to be aJehovah's
Witness.30 6 One of the bases for the majority's affirmance of an adverse
credibility finding was that the applicant had given his testimony under
oath, an act believed to be inconsistent with Jehovah's Witness beliefs. In
his dissent,Judge Ferguson criticized this finding, first noting that there did
not appear to be an objective basis in the record for the belief that
Jehovah's Witnesses do not give testimony under oath. Judge Ferguson
referred to the IJ's 'personal belief thatJehovah's Witnesses do not swear
under oath' and the IJ's 'improper ... reliance on his understanding of the
religious practices ofJehovah's Witnesses'. 30 7 In addition,Judge Ferguson
took note of the cross-cultural and language issues, observing that there
may be a difference in Spanish between 'swearing' and 'affirming ' 3° 8 and
it was unclear if the interpreter made that distinction clear. Finally, the
Judge alluded to the pressure that an asylum seeker may be under, noting
that the two times that the applicant 'swore under oath were in response to
the court's direction that he take the oath'.30 9
Tribunal decisions from Canada and New Zealand acknowledge other
problems related to assessing credibility on the basis of knowledge of
303 The RSAA noted that: 'Our decision to interpret the Refugee Convention as requiring,
implicitly, good faith on the part of the asylum seeker turns on a value judgement that the Refugee
Convention was intended to protect only those in genuine need of surrogate international protection
and that the system must be protected from those who would seek, in a surplace situation, to deliberately
manipulate circumstances merely to achieve the advantages which recognition as a refugee confers'.
Refugee Appeal No. 2254/94, at 37.
305 Naji, n. 297 above, 949.
306 Mdia-Paiz v. IN.S., 111 F.3d 720 (9' h Cir. 1997) [FergusonJ dissenting].
307 Ibid. at 726.
308 Ibid.
309 Ibid.
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religion or consistency of actions with beliefs. First, the adjudicator may be
asking questions regarding religion which are totally inappropriate either
in an objective sense, or in the cross-cultural context of an asylum pro-
ceeding. The New Zealand tribunal addressed these issues in a case where
the officer had asked the Chinese applicant seven pages of typewritten
questions regarding Christianity, including questions which 'could be
answered only with extreme difficulty even by English-speaking persons
versed in theology ... [with a] memory that permitted the parrot recita-
tion of randomly chosen excerpts from either the Bible or the
Psalms ... ,.310 In addition to criticizing these questions as inappropriate,
a fact exacerbated by 'translation difficulties', the RSAA referred to
Bastanipour for the point that the determinative issue is whether the Chinese
authorities considered the applicant to be an adherent to his new faith.3 1 1
Another issue which tribunals recognize may arise when adjudicators
quiz applicants about religious tenets or practice is that the adjudicators
may be poorly informed themselves on these issues. The Federal Court in
Canada quashed a decision of the CRDD in the case of an Iranian who
alleged he converted from Islam to Zoroastrianism. 3 12 The CRDD had
based its adverse credibility finding partially on the fact that the applicant
'did not know of the famous Zoroastrian temple in Yazd' 3 13 when in fact
the temple in question was an Islamic mosque and not Zoroastrian.
3 14
31 ReugeeAppeal No. 1496/93 (1995) at 3, available at (http://www.refugee.org.nz).
311 Ibid. at 4. A case currently pending at the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (Chang Hua Wang v.
Ashcroft, 02-2814) demonstrates that adjudicators continue to evaluate the risk of persecution from the
adjudicator's perspective, rather than that of the persecutor. The applicant in this case was a young
Chinese woman who practiced in an underground Catholic church, not authorized by the govern-
ment. Her testimony that she had practiced on a weekly basis with the underground church for five
years before fleeing China was unchallenged and accepted as true, as was her testimony that she
attended church on a regular basis since arriving in the U.S. The immigration judge, however, found
her religious claim to be weakened by the fact that she had not been baptized as a Catholic, did not
know the name of the current Pope, was never 'formally registered with the Catholic Church', and had
two abortions while in the United States - one of them the result of a pregnancy resulting from
repeated rapes at the hands of the smugglers who transported her to the United States.
Regarding the abortions, the immigration judge stated:
The Court is concerned by the fact that the applicant has had two abortions while in the United States.
The Court does not dispute the applicant's right under the American legal system to obtain an
abortion. However, it is a well-established fact that one of the primary doctrines of the Catholic
Church, and probably the most publicly known doctrine of the Catholic Church, is strong opposition
to abortion. The Court feels that the fact that the applicant has had two abortions in this country [sic]
that detracts from the strength of her claims for religious convictions under Catholicism.
Decision of the Immigration Judge, File #A72 898 126, at 16.
All of the factors cited by the judge are relevant to whether he thought the applicant was a good
Catholic, rather than whether the Chinese government would perceive her as being a Catholic
practicing in a prohibited manner.
312 Razm v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] Docket: IMM-3796-98, available at
(htp: //decisionsfct-cf gc.ca).
13 Ibid., at 2.
314 A documentary on the U.S. asylum system captures a similar incident on film in which an
asylum officer explains that he denied the claim of an Anglican from Romania because in response to
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In other cases, the tribunals take note of the fact that lack of knowledge
may be an inappropriate basis for denial where religion overlaps with
nationality, and the applicant has presented unchallenged proof of nation-
ality. This factual scenario arose in Markovskaia v. Canada,315 where the
Federal Court of Canada quashed a CRDD decision in the case of a
Jewish applicant from the Ukraine. The CRDD had been troubled by the
applicant's 'vague and general' knowledge of her religion, and had see-
mingly ignored the fact that documents whose authenticity had not been
questioned (the applicant's birth certificate indicating the nationality of
both of her parents as Jewish, and her internal passport identifying her as
Jewish) established that she was in fact Jewish.
Notwithstanding recognition of the limitations inherent in the 'knowl-
edge/consistency' approach to credibility, tribunals do continue to uphold
adverse credibility findings on this basis. Sometimes the applicants have a
fairly extensive lack of knowledge, 3 17 while in other cases the denial is on
the basis of an inability to answer what appear to be more specific and
demanding questions. In this latter category would be the case of an
applicant from Pakistan who alleged problems arising from his member-
ship in the Shi'a sect of Islam.3 1 The federal court upheld an adverse
determination based on the applicant's inability to name Shi'a's twelve
imams, to demonstrate the washing ritual performed prior to regular
prayers, or to correctly answer a question regarding the sequence of
evening and night prayers among the Shi'a.3 19 The applicant's attorney
protested that the level of knowledge expected of Mr Hussain about his
faith was beyond what ordinary religious practitioners in the U.S. possess
regarding their own faiths.
32 0
his question as to who is the head of the Anglican Church, she had responded the Bishop of Gibraltar.
He states: 'How many Anglicans do you know who don't know that the Archbishop of Canterbury is
the head of the Anglican Church?' The asylum officer turned out to be wrong, and the asylum seeker
right - she was subsequently granted asylum by an immigration judge. See 'Well-Founded Fear',
Directors/Producers Shari Robertson and Michael Camerini (US 2000).
315 .MIarkovskaia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immngration) [1994] 51 A.C.W.S. (3d) 519, also
available at 1994 A.C.W.SJ. LEXIS 75205.
316 Ibid. at para. 7.
317 See, for example, 7an Hua Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2001] FCT 1245 at
para. 9, also available at (http://www.decisionsfct-cfgc.ca) (sixteen year old Chinese boy claiming to be
Protestant Christian who could only talk of faith in general terms, did not know what confirmation
meant, what Sunday service was, where his pastor preached, or what denomination he belonged to).318 Atif Hussain v. Canada (Minister of Citizensip and Immigration) [2000] Docket: IMM-1940-99,
available at (http://decisions.fct-cfgc.ca).
319 Ibid. at para. 14.
320 His counsel addressed the panel as follows:
The subtleties of the faith, even fundamentals can be unknown to practitioners of the faith. I mean, my
own personal knowledge being raised in a very devout Catholic family and the Catholic school I still
couldn't name you the Ten Commandments in order. The only cardinal sin I could be sure of naming
is the Cardinal of Manila ....
AtfHussain at para. 24.
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3.5.3 Sur Place Claims
Individuals who claim to be refugees sur place as a result of conversion in
the host country to a religion persecuted in their home country are often
suspected of opportunism, and the genuineness of their conversion
becomes a key issue in the determination process.
Decisions from New Zealand and the U.K. demonstrate somewhat
different approaches to addressing the issue of sur place conversion. The
New Zealand decisions - all involving Iranians - appear to include an
in-depth review of the individual facts in an effort to judge the credibility of
the conversion, as well as a predisposition to accord the asylum seeker the
benefit of the doubt. The U.K. decisions are shorter, and therefore less
susceptible of analysis, but to the degree that analysis is possible, the U.K.
tribunals seem less willing to extend the benefit of the doubt, and more
inclined to conclude that the conversion was opportunistic.
321In Refugee Appeal Number 70720/97, the New Zealand tribunal consid-
ered the claim of an Iranian woman and her husband who first raised the
issue of conversion to Christianity in a second application for asylum, after
their first claim, based on political opinion, had been denied.32 Although
the timing of the claim could have heightened concerns regarding fabrica-
tion of the claim, the tribunal reviewed the couple's relationship to Islam in
Iran (not devout), their experience of Christianity in New Zealand (positive
with extensive assistance and support from Christians), and the wife's
mental state (anxious and depressed, and soothed by the suport of her
newfound spirituality) to conclude that the claim was genuine.
The RSAA carried out a similar review in Refugee Appeal Number 71066/
98,324 also involving Iranian converts to Christianity, who asserted the
conversion in a second application after the first was denied.32 5 The
tribunal considered that the wife was drawn to Christianity because she
'perceive[d it] as being predicated on a more equitable belief system'
regarding gender issues, that she had converted slowly, having contact
with three different Christian denominations before deciding, and that she
had corroborative evidence regarding her involvement in the church. 6
In Refugee Appeal Number 71551/99,327 the female appellant's sur place
conversion was found credible in light of her disaffection from Islam while
living in Iran, friendship and support from Christians she met in
321 Refugee Appeal No. 70720/97 (1998), available at (htp://www.nzrefigeeappeals.govt.nz/default.asp)
(visited 26July 2002).
322 Ibid. at 2.
323 Ibid. at 8, 10.
324 Refgee Appeal No. 71066/98 (1999), available at (http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/default.asp)
(visited 26July 2002).
325 Ibid.
326 Ibid. at 6.
327 Refugee Appeal No. 71551/99 (1999), available at (http://www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/default.asp)
(visited 25July 2002).
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New Zealand, and the fact that her participation in the church and her
commitment to it was corroborated by a church member.3 2 8 In Refugee
AppealNumber 71227/99, 329 the tribunal gave the benefit of the doubt, and
found credible the male applicant's conversion to Catholicism where he
had been persecuted and forced to flee Iran for dating a Catholic woman,
and his interest and commitment to his faith was corroborated by mem-
bers of the church.3 3 °
As noted earlier, the three U.K. decisions involving sur place claims are
short of facts, but the cases recite the following reasons for disbelief of
conversion: the Pakistani convert to Ahmadi faith could not satisfactorily
explain his beliefs; 33 1 the Pakistani convert to Ahmadi faith had not
mentioned the conversion at his initial interview, and the adjudicator
believed his corroborative evidence had been forged; 332 the applicant,
whose husband was Ahmadi, did not convert until she arrived in the
U.K.3 33
3.5.4 Other Credibilipy Issues in Religion Cases
Although they are not specific or unique to religion cases, the decisions in
credibility address other issues which often come up in adjudicating the
truthfulness of the claim. There are several cases which hold that failure to
mention religious persecution at the onset does not defeat the claim.33 4 A
substantial number of cases follow the UNHCR Handbook paragraph 199
guidance that '[u]ntrue statements by themselves are not a reason for
refusal of refugee status[.]'. 335 These cases cover situations involving out-
right lies, 'embellishments' and forged evidence. Yet where the core of the
claim was credible, the fact that the applicant had lied or exaggerated in an
attempt to strengthen the claim, did not defeat it.
3 3 6
328 Ibid. at 6.
329 Refigee AppealNo. 71227/99 (1999), available at (http://www.nzrefugeeappeaLs.gov.nz/defaut.asp).
330 Refugee Appeal No. 71227/99 at 8.
331 Queen, Ex Parte Butt v. Secretary of State of the Home Department [1998] EWCA Civ 1858, also
available at (http://wwvw.bailii.org).
332 Hussain v. Secretary of Statefor the Home Department [1998] (CA), available at (http://www.lexis.com).
a33 Iasmin v. Secretay ofStatefor the Home Department, [1999] EWCA Civ 1633, also available at (http://
www.bailii.org).
334 See, for example, RefugeeAppealfNo. 300/92, n. 137 above, at para. 5 (Iranian who converted to
Hare Krishna found credible even though he only referred 'obliquely' to the religious aspect of his
claim during his Refugee Status Section interview; tribunal noted that he was fearful the information
could come to the notice of the Iranian authorities); RefugeeAppealNo. 265/92 (1994) at 5, available at
(http://www.refugee.org.nz/csearch.htm) (visited 19June 2002) (reversing adverse credibility finding in case
of Iranian applicant, where one of three reasons for not finding him credible was his failure to disclose
basis of claim upon arrival at Auckland airport).
335 UNHCR, Handbook, n. 22 above, para. 199.
336 See, for example, Chen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 2002 FCT 480,
also available at (http://www.decisionsfct-cfge.ca) (in claim by Falun Gong adherent from China, lies
about one aspect of claim may not preclude having a well-founded fear); Refugee Appeal No. 2223/94
(1996) at 12 (Iranian woman who lied about facts of departure from her country found to be credible
about core facts of claim); RefugeeAppealfNo. 70222/96 (1997) at 18 (Pakistani man with long history of
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In sum, factfinders utilize various approaches in attempting to evaluate
the truthfulness of religion-based claims, including testing knowledge of
religion andjudging consistency of actions with asserted beliefs. Suspicions
regarding the sincerity of claims are often heightened in post-departure
conversions. The approaches to judging credibility must be sensitive to the
nature of religious belief, religious persecution (including persecution for
imputed religious affiliation or belie) and cross-cultural issues. With that in
mind, the following conclusions might be drawn:
" Detailed knowledge of the applicant's religion does not necessarily
correlate to sincerity of belief.
" In questioning an applicant about his/her religion, the factfinder is to
be aware of the educational, cultural, psychological and other factors
which may have an affect on the applicant's knowledge of his or her
religion.
" The factfinder should take into consideration limitations on religious
practice in the country of origin, and how they may impact the
applicant's knowledge of his or her faith.
" Detailed knowledge of the applicant's religion does not necessarily
correlate to the risk of persecution.
" Notwithstanding a lack of detailed knowledge, persecutors in the
home country may consider the applicant to be an adherent of the
disfavored or persecuted religion, and persecute them as such (that is,
for imputed beliefs).
" In situations where aspects of the applicant's beliefs or actions are
being evaluated, the factfinder should make all attempts necessary to
confirm that his own knowledge of the religion - upon which he is
judging the applicant - is correct.
" It is encouraged that experts be consulted to provide reliable
information regarding the religion at issue.
* The fact that a conversion is post-departure should not give rise to a
presumption that the claim is fabricated. The factfinder should make
an inquiry into the applicant's past and present circumstances in
order to properly evaluate whether the conversion is genuine.
abuse by family and clerics, who had psychiatric problems, and who was found to have embellished,
exaggerated, given false information, and a forged document was found credible as to central facts of
claim); Refiigee Appeal No. 70692/97 (1998) at 16 (RSAA had doubts about departure-related facts in
claim of ethnic Korean in China who developed relationships with Christian missionaries, but found
remainder of his claim credible and gave him the benefit of the doubt); Refuigee Appeal .'o. 70903/98
(1998) at II (some aspects of claim of citizen of Ukraine appeared questionable, but fact that he had
been beaten by militia because he isJewish was corroborated and believable); RefigeeAppealNo. 70851 /
98 (1998) at 4 (core of claim found credible in case of Catholic from Bangladesh who admitted he had
lied about one aspect of story, and submitted a false police arrest document) [available at (http://
wew.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz/default.asp)]; Secretay of State for Home Department v. Drnas [1 997] EWCA Civ
1181 at 3, available at (http://zvv.ein.org.uk/index.html) (upholding grant of asylum to Copt from the
Sudan who had submitted a forged document, where 'centrepiece' of his story was found credible).
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4. Conclusion
" It is the premise of this article that the drafters of the Refugee Con-
vention intended international norms relating to freedom of religion or
belief to inform the determination of claims based on religion.
" A survey of the jurisprudence of the United States, Canada, New
Zealand and the United Kingdom illustrates that this is not always
the case, and that there are identifiable problems in a number of key
areas.
" First, serious harms in the form of (1) physical assaults, (2) discrimina-
tory measures of a substantially prejudicial nature, (3) limitations on
religion, and (4) forced compliance with religious norms are often not
recognized as persecution, even though they merit such recognition
when analyzed within the framework of international human rights
norms. This can be remedied by greater incorporation of international
guidance into the evaluation of whether a harm constitutes persecu-
tion. Second, beliefs or practices which meet the international criteria
for recognition as a 'religion' are often rejected as such. Greater
attention to relevant international authority, such as the UDHR, the
ICCPR, relevant General Comments ussed by the U.N. Human
Rights Committee, and other like bodies, is called for to improve
decision-making in this area. Third, overly formalistic nexus determi-
nations frequently result in a failure of protection from persecution on
religious grounds. The adoption of a flexible nexus analysis, which is
neither exclusively intent-based nor effects-based, and which incorpo-
rates the UNHCR's bifurcated analysis, would greatly remedy this
problem. Fourth, adjudicator suspicion of religion-based claims -
especially in cases of surplace conversion - has lead to the imposition
of what is often an inappropriate approach to credibility determina-
tion. The recognition that a detailed knowledge of the applicant's
religion does not necessarily correlate to sincerity of belief or to
the risk of persecution would improve the credibility determination
process.
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